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INTRODUCTION
Historic Manhattan middle-class housing development Stuyvesant Town
was listed for sale in 2006 by its original developer, Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company (MetLife).1 Tenants, afraid that a new landlord would
increase their rents, responded with an unlikely move: they put together
financing for a bid to purchase the 11,250-unit development themselves.2
Built in 1947, Stuyvesant Town persisted as a bastion of middle-class rental
apartments on the East Side for decades3 — even as much of the rest of

1. See Charles V. Bagli, More Than 12 Expected to Bid for Complexes, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct.
4,
2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/04/nyregion/04stuyvesant.html
[https://perma.cc/8A9M-5ZQ7].
2. See id. Stuyvesant Town was originally constructed with 110 buildings with a total
of 11,250 apartments. See A History of StuyTown & Peter Cooper Village, STUYTOWN (Jan.
12,
2019),
https://www.stuytown.com/guides/stuytown/history
[https://perma.cc/EVN6-2UGE].
3. See Kevin Sweeting, How Stuy Town Got a Tourniquet While Blackstone Gets
Billions,
GOTHAMIST
(Mar.
31,
2016,
12:35
PM),
https://gothamist.com/news/how-stuy-town-got-a-tourniquet-while-blackstone-gets-billions
[https://perma.cc/77KB-39X5]; Adam Tanaka, Fiduciary Landlords: Life Insurers and
Large-Scale Housing in New York City 50 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud. of Harvard Univ.,
Working
Paper,
2017),
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Manhattan became unaffordable to all but wealthy New Yorkers.4 In 2006,
when MetLife announced the sale, Stuyvesant Town’s rents reflected its
middle-class reputation: three-quarters of apartments were regulated with
rents well below market rate. 5 Because Stuyvesant Town’s rents were
lower than in surrounding neighborhoods, tenants feared that new
ownership would increase rents.6
The tenants’ unprecedented attempt to purchase the development was
met with derision and a wide range of obstacles.7 Their ultimate bid of
$4.5 billion lost to Tishman Speyer and BlackRock’s bid of $5.4 billion,8
which ranked the acquisition as the biggest real estate deal in U.S. history.9
Following the sale, as tenants had feared, landlord Tishman Speyer began
trying to push out long-time tenants to increase rents on their apartments.10

https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/tanaka_fiduciary_landlords_final_4-18-17_
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2G8-XYAT].
4. Stuyvesant Town’s successes as an affordable housing development are deeply
marred by its dismal history of racial segregation. MetLife explicitly built Stuyvesant Town
for white residents and failed to integrate even after lawsuits to force it to. See Tanaka,
supra note 3, at 46–47. So while the famed development has been an important asset for
Lower Manhattan, the exact model also has deep flaws. See Brad Lander, A Very High
Stakes
Deal,
SHELTERFORCE
(Nov.
23,
2006),
https://shelterforce.org/2006/11/23/a_very_high_stakes_deal/
[https://perma.cc/R8GK-L7FJ].
5. See Bagli, supra note 1.
6. See id. Stuyvesant Town’s rental prices were below market because they had been
locked in to rent regulation before the neighborhood’s average rents increased so much. See
id. The sale of Stuyvesant Town promised “potential windfall profits” for investors, who
were able to take apartments out of regulation and increase rents to the much higher
market-rate for the neighborhood. See id.
7. See, e.g., Gerard Flynn, MetLife: Tenants ‘Not Qualified’ to Buy Stuy Town, AMNY
(Sept.
26,
2006),
https://www.amny.com/news/metlife-tenants-not-qualified-to-buy-stuy-town/
[https://perma.cc/3XX5-LB77].
8. See Stephanie Gaskell, Stuyvesant Town-Peter Cooper Village Tenants Association
Seek Second Chance to Buy Building Complex, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 15, 2009, 1:21
AM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/real-estate/stuyvesant-town-peter-cooper-village-te
nants-association-seeks-chance-buy-building-complex-article-1.384430
[https://perma.cc/A7QV-P9NH].
9. See Gabriel Sherman, The Biggest, Baddest Real-Estate Loan, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 18,
2009),
https://nymag.com/realestate/features/62880/
[https://perma.cc/C27L-69AK].
Tishman Speyer turned out to have dramatically overpaid for Stuyvesant Town and
defaulted on the loan shortly thereafter with the help of an unfavorable court case on rent
deregulation. See Charles V. Bagli & Christine Haughney, Wide Fallout in Failed Deal for
Stuyvesant
Town,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
25,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/nyregion/26stuy.html
[https://perma.cc/BW3R-9XAW].
10. See Sweeting, supra note 3 (“In 2009, they rained down threats of eviction and
distributed nonrenewal notices around the complex like takeout menus. Residents organized
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Because the new owners had paid such an inflated price for Stuyvesant
Town, they needed to rapidly raise rents to pay for the debt they took out to
buy the property.11 They were not able to increase rental income quickly
enough, though: Tishman Speyer and BlackRock went into default and lost
the development.12 The damage was done, however. Although Stuyvesant
Town’s next owner promised some affordability in exchange for a City
subsidy, less than half of the development’s apartments currently have
below-market rents, and they are not affordable for middle-class New
Yorkers like those who lived there for so long.13
What if Stuyvesant Town tenants, like tenants in Washington, D.C.,14
had the first right to purchase their home when their landlord put them up
for sale? What kind of program or subsidy or technical assistance could
have shifted the outcome in favor of the tenants?15 Or does this example
show that in overheated markets, tenants may never be able to compete
with bids from predatory investment firms and massive developers?
This event illustrates many aspects of the broader housing affordability
problem in New York City. Much of the City’s affordable middle- and
working-class housing stock, like Stuyvesant Town, was built over 50
years ago under a unique combination of economic, political, and legal
conditions that do not exist anymore. 16 That housing stock, for a time,
to challenge the nonrenewals but, faced with intimidation and harassment, hundreds of
tenants — both legal and not — vacated their apartments.”).
11. In order to obtain financing for such a high price, the buyer would have had to
estimate that rental income would triple by 2011. See Gabriel Sherman, Clash of the
Utopias, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 30, 2009), http://nymag.com/realestate/features/53797/
[https://perma.cc/2MR6-EA7W].
12. See Bagli & Haughney, supra note 9.
13. See Elizabeth Kim, City Spent $220 Million to Keep Stuy Town Apartments
Affordable; Turns Out, It Didn’t Have To, GOTHAMIST (July 18, 2019, 10:00 AM),
https://gothamist.com/news/city-spent-220-million-to-keep-stuy-town-apartments-affordabl
e-turns-out-it-didnt-have-to [https://perma.cc/67U8-8UTG].
14. See infra Section II.B.i.
15. Then-Councilmember Dan Garodnick, lifelong Stuyvesant Town resident who
helped negotiate the tenants’ bid, later said such a right for tenants would have “added
leverage to the tenants’ position . . . and created an actual obligation to work with [them].”
Georgia Kromrei, Real Estate Pros Call Tenant Takeover Bill Flawed, REAL DEAL (Feb. 4,
2020,
12:00
PM)
[hereinafter
Kromrei,
Real
Estate
Pros],
https://therealdeal.com/2020/02/04/real-estate-pros-call-tenant-takeover-bill-flawed/
[https://perma.cc/8SS5-9HEF].
16. See ALEXANDRA BROMLEY ET AL., DEP’T OF URB. AFFS. & PLAN., HUNTER COLL.,
WHERE WILL NEW YORKERS LIVE?: OVERHAULING NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING POLICY 23–
24
(2012),
http://www.hunterurban.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/HunterUrban_Where-Will-New-Y
orkers-Live.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7SZ-28MU]. Stuyvesant Town was developed amidst an
unusually pressing need for middle-class housing, created by a flood of returning veterans
looking for housing, an extremely low vacancy rate, and a large gap between market rate
and public housing rents. See Tanaka, supra note 3, at 49. The development was supported
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enabled average New Yorkers to afford rent comfortably.17 But housing
became progressively less affordable starting in the 1990s due to policies
that permitted landlords to deregulate rent-stabilized units and increase
rents more dramatically.18
The Stuyvesant Town example also illustrates the cost of predatory
equity19 winning the day: despite years of tenant organizing, and an influx
of City subsidy and affordability requirements imposed in the 2015 sale to
Blackstone, tenants have nonetheless undergone years of harassment,20 and
the development is substantially less affordable than it was 15 years ago.21
Tenant ownership alone would not have resolved every issue, but an
alternative history without the role of predatory investors would have
resulted in a better outcome for affordability.
The failed bid of the Stuyvesant Town tenants also provides a preview of
the challenges that a law like Washington, D.C.’s Tenant Opportunity to
Purchase Act (TOPA) would face in New York City.22 It illustrates that
tenants, without the legal requirement that they get the first opportunity to
purchase ahead of third parties, will rarely prevail in buying their building
on the open market. That legal requirement, alone, however, is also
unlikely to be sufficient to enable tenants to buy. In addition to a first right
to purchase, the Stuyvesant Town tenants would have also needed
additional financing to meet the top private bid; in an overheated market,
the first bite at the apple is not enough to beat out predatory equity.

by the government through (1) legal changes to permit investment for financial institutions,
(2) expansion of eminent domain for land assembly for private-public projects, and (3) tax
exemptions for such projects. See id. at 41–42. That the tenements previously on that land
had deteriorated conditions, had decreased in population in recent years, and were
predominantly populated by working-class immigrants made it politically and economically
feasible to raze and start over. See id. at 9.
17. See Elyzabeth Gaumer, 50+ Years of Housing in New York City, TABLEAU PUB.,
https://public.tableau.com/profile/elyzabeth.gaumer6154#!/vizhome/HVS_KeyTrends_Test
_3-14/Story1 [https://perma.cc/73BT-YQUW] (last visited Oct. 26, 2020) (click
“AFFORDABILITY”).
18. The City lost over 150,000 rent-stabilized units to deregulation between 1993 and
2018. See Kim Barker, Behind New York’s Housing Crisis: Weakened Laws and
Fragmented
Regulation,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
20,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/20/nyregion/affordable-housing-nyc.html
[https://perma.cc/627T-Y94T].
19. See ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., PREDATORY EQUITY: EVOLUTION OF A
CRISIS
5
(2009),
https://www.anhd.org/sites/default/files/predatory_equity_evolution_of_a_crisis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A34C-ZU8F].
20. See Sweeting, supra note 3.
21. See Kim, supra note 13.
22. See infra Section II.B.i.
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The Stuyvesant Town saga is just one of the innumerable battles waged
on New York City’s affordable housing 23 front, by tenants and
policymakers alike. Despite its significant efforts to increase the number of
affordable units in recent years,24 however, New York City has not been
successful by most measures.25
The major barrier to increasing the amount of affordable housing in New
York City is strong market pressure, which is created by a combination of
factors such as economic policies that incentivize speculative investment in
real estate, and zoning policies that drive up the price of land.26 Unless rent
laws limit rent increases, strong market pressure drives rents upward.
Increasing rents combined with a low vacancy rate leaves tenants with
fewer choices and less power, leading to poor conditions and housing
instability.27
A wide swath of New Yorkers struggle to pay rent, and unaffordable
rents affect these New Yorkers by causing apartment overcrowding, long
commutes, and strained finances. These effects do not fall equally,
however: poor housing conditions and housing instability fall hardest on
Latinx and Black tenants, and tenants who are single mothers, are disabled,

23. Although the phrase “affordable housing” dominates the issue of high-cost rents in
New York City and across the country, the term has significant issues. See Michael E.
Stone, Housing Affordability: One-Third of a Nation Shelter-Poor, in A RIGHT TO HOUSING:
FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA 38, 41 (Rachel Bratt et al. eds., 2006). Stone calls
the phrase “at best meaningless and at worst misleading,” and ties its use to “the retreat from
public responsibility for the plight of the poor.” Id. Stone also argued that while the phrase’s
typical use implies that affordability is a characteristic of the apartments, the word
“affordable” more properly refers to a “relationship between housing and people,” and
therefore only holds meaning if three questions are answered: “Affordable to whom? On
what standard of affordability? For how long?” Stone offers “below-market housing” as a
“more accurate and honest” alternative to “affordable housing” in many cases. Id. This Note
strives to use “affordable housing” as informed by those three questions: to refer in a
relative sense to housing affordability for those who need it at levels they can afford.
“Below-market housing” is used for other housing that may have regulated rents or receive
public subsidy but may not be “affordable” to its residents or those who would live there.
24. See generally OFF. OF THE MAYOR, CITY OF N.Y., HOUSING NEW YORK: A
FIVE-BOROUGH, TEN-YEAR PLAN (2015) [hereinafter HOUSING NEW YORK],
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/housing/downloads/pdf/housing_plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BW5C-J58C].
25. See also Oksana Mironova, Race and Evictions in New York City, CMTY. SERV.
SOC’Y
(June
22,
2020)
[hereinafter
Mironova,
Race
and
Evictions],
https://www.cssny.org/news/entry/race-evictions-new-york-city
[https://perma.cc/A4BK-22DP]. The COVID-19 pandemic has deepened those disparities.
See id. See generally OFF. OF N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, NYC FOR ALL:
THE
HOUSING
WE
NEED
(2018),
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/The_Housing_We_Need-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H2EW-H3EE].
26. See infra Section I.E.
27. See infra Section I.E.
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or are immigrants. 28 Many New Yorkers, including middle- and upperincome residents, struggle to find housing that costs less than 30% of their
paycheck, but the harshest effects, such as eviction and homelessness,
mostly affect Black and Latinx New Yorkers.29
Local and federal housing policies have not overcome housing insecurity
in New York City because they do not address the problem’s root causes.30
Rather than structure housing to protect tenants from market pressure,
housing policy often creates housing through profit-driven public-private
partnerships.31 In order to make use of the private investment on which
these policies rely, the government in return offers subsidy sufficient to
enable a profit for the developer, on top of already high development
costs.32 This model thus requires substantial subsidy to incentivize even
modest affordability.33 Because it is so expensive to subsidize any belowmarket housing development on this model, most buildings created do not
serve the needs of low-income New Yorkers — “affordable” buildings
have too few below-market apartments that are not affordable enough and
cease to be affordable too quickly.34
While the current economic, legal, and political conditions in New York
City pose challenges to turning the tide on the City’s housing affordability
crisis, these conditions also provide unique opportunities. This Note argues

28. See GISELLE ROUTHIER, COAL. FOR HOMELESS, STATE OF THE HOMELESS 2019,
(2019),
https://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/StateOfThe-Homeles
s2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RSU-SW5E]; Mironova, Race and Evictions, supra note 25;
Jack Mullan et al., Amid Bright Signs for NYC Families, Challenges Remain for
Single-Parent
Households,
CITY
LIMITS
(Oct.
25,
2019),
https://citylimits.org/2019/10/25/amid-bright-signs-for-nyc-families-challenges-remain-for-s
ingle-parent-families/ [https://perma.cc/H2WE-LF9W].
29. Latinx tenants are the likeliest group to be threatened with eviction, and Black
tenants the second most likely. See Mironova, Race and Evictions, supra note 25.
30. See infra Section I.B.
31. See Oksana Mironova & Thomas J. Waters, Social Housing in the U.S., CMTY.
SERV. SOC’Y (Feb. 18, 2020) [hereinafter Mironova & Waters, Social Housing],
https://www.cssny.org/news/entry/social-housing-in-the-us [https://perma.cc/QJ24-ZC5D].
32. See STEPHANIE SOSA, ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., MAXIMIZING THE
PUBLIC VALUE OF NEW YORK CITY-FINANCED AFFORDABLE HOUSING: A REPORT ON
SELECTED TRENDS IN CITY-FINANCED AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 12, 18–19
(2019),
https://anhd.org/sites/default/files/2019_public_value_report_october2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B8VD-H8B9].
33. See ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., PERMANENT AFFORDABILITY:
PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS 5, 7–8 (2015) [hereinafter PERMANENT AFFORDABILITY],
https://anhd.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/2015-Permanent-Affordability-Practical-Soluti
ons.pdf [https://perma.cc/N69E-JEF2].
34. See id.
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that a Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA)35 for New York City is
uniquely poised to take advantage of those opportunities to address the
City’s housing affordability problem because it would create a broad-based
mechanism for turning privately-owned apartment buildings on the
speculative market into tenant-directed affordable housing at the point of
ownership change. Recently put forth by a Brooklyn legislator, a TOPA
law for New York City would give tenants the first right to purchase their
apartment building, with City support, should it go up for sale.36 Tenants
could then choose to form a limited-equity cooperative 37 or assign their
purchase right to a nonprofit organization to run the building as affordable
rentals.38 A TOPA law, with sufficient funding, would thus give residents
meaningful control of their building, promote social equity, and provide a
pipeline of permanent or long-term affordable housing across
neighborhoods.
While funding this program sufficiently to operate meaningfully would
be expensive, it would result in the kind of deep39 and long-term affordable

35. The first TOPA was in Washington, D.C., but models around the country have
borrowed the name. See infra Section II.A. This Note uses “TOPA law” to refer to any of
the legislation modeled after the D.C. law.
36. See also infra Section III.B.
37. Limited-equity cooperatives (LECs) are a type of housing cooperative. Generally,
housing cooperatives are “owned collectively by a corporation and controlled by residents.
The corporation holds the title to the property while each resident owns an interest or shares
in that corporation.” Limited-Equity Co-Ops, URB. OMNIBUS (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://urbanomnibus.net/2018/01/limited-equity-co-ops/
[https://perma.cc/2K6K-C69H].
LECs, specifically,
are income-restricted, placing affordable homeownership in reach of low-income
and middle-income households. In a limited-equity cooperative, members
purchase shares at below-market costs in exchange for limits on resale prices . . . .
When a cooperator in a limited-equity co-op decides to sell, she typically receives
back the cost of her initial investment plus interest — but only a small profit
(typically a percentage of the equity accrued), which puts the brakes on the
speculative nature of the private real estate market.
Id.
38. See infra Section II.A.
39. The “depth” of affordability refers to how low the rents are set. For example, an
apartment with a rent set to be affordable for someone making 20% of the area median
income is more “deeply affordable” than a unit with a rent that is affordable to someone
making 80% of the area median income. New York City has failed to produce enough
deeply affordable units in recent years, as seen in the data on how many units are available
versus needed for people who are very low income (VLI) and extremely low income (ELI).
See OFF. OF N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, supra note 25, at 10.
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housing that current programs aim for40 and spend a significant amount of
money on, but do not achieve.41 On the one hand, the COVID-19 health
and economic crisis means that there is dramatically less room in the City’s
budget for any new program.42 On the other hand, both the 2019 rent law
reforms43 and the COVID-19 economic downturn are expected to decrease
prices for some multifamily apartment buildings. 44 Decreased property
values in New York City combined with political momentum around the
value of secure housing — as seen in the recent success of the eviction
moratorium45 — may provide a rare opening for this type of law.
Part I of this Note lays out the general problem of housing affordability
in New York City, including the link between market pressure and tenant
disempowerment and the racial disparities in those harms. It also describes
the current real estate market and why traditional, profit-based affordable
housing programs have not succeeded. Part II describes what a first right
of purchase is and how other jurisdictions around the country have used it.
Part III proposes what a TOPA law46 should look like in New York City,
and Part IV discusses some challenges related to implementation of a New
York City TOPA law.
I. NEW YORK CITY’S AFFORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS
A. What the Problem Looks Like
It is famously difficult to afford rent in New York City. Renters make
up about two-thirds of New Yorkers, 47 and more than half of all renter

40. See Vincent J. Reina, Affordable Housing, but for How Long? The Opportunity and
Challenge of Mandating Permanently Affordable Housing, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1267,
1277–78 (2019).
41. See OFF. OF N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, supra note 25.
42. See Jeffery C. Mays, Virus Forces a ‘Wartime’ Budget on N.Y.C., with $2 Billion in
Cuts,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
16,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/nyregion/nyc-budget-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/P4GC-X9DW].
43. See Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act, 2019 Sess. Law News of N.Y.
Legis. Memo. Ch. 36 (McKinney 2019).
44. See infra Section I.D.
45. See Rachel Vick, Tenant Advocates Celebrate Temporary Eviction Moratorium,
QUEENS
DAILY
EAGLE
(Mar.
17,
2020),
https://queenseagle.com/all/tenant-advocates-celebrate-temporary-eviction-moratorium
[https://perma.cc/46DW-F4SX].
46. “First right of purchase” (or “first right to purchase”) is the legal mechanism under
discussion, and “TOPA laws” are the legislation that instate that right for tenants. This Note
generally uses “first right of purchase” to refer to the legal right and “TOPA law” to refer to
the legislation.
47. See NYU FURMAN CTR., STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING AND
NEIGHBORHOODS
IN
2018,
at
21
(2019),
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households in the City are moderately or severely rent burdened.48 Severe
rent burden falls unequally across racial groups: substantially more Latinx,
Asian, and Black New Yorkers pay over 50% of their income on rent as
compared to white New Yorkers. 49 Driven in part by the low vacancy
rate,50 the picture for renters seeking a new apartment is particularly bleak:
the median gross rent in 2018 citywide was $1,443,51 but the median asking
rent — or the median rent amount for available apartments — was
$2,650.52 The high median asking rent makes it incredibly challenging for
people to find a new, affordable apartment to move into.53 Evictions have
decreased since the enactment of a 2017 New York City law providing
legal representation to low-income tenants, but there were still over 16,000
evictions in 2019.54 In the past few years, the average monthly homeless
shelter population has grown above 60,000. 55 Like rent burden,
homelessness and eviction also disproportionately affect New Yorkers
depending on their race: Latinx and Black New Yorkers experience
evictions and homelessness at higher rates than other New Yorkers.56

https://furmancenter.org/files/sotc/2018_SOC_Full_2018-07-31.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H4CH-PT2W].
48. See id. at 24 (“Renter households that spend between 30 and 50 percent of their
pre-tax income on gross rent (including utilities) are considered moderately rent burdened
while those spending more than 50 percent of their income on gross rent are considered
severely rent burdened.”).
49. See New York’s Rent Affordability Crisis Harshly Impacts Families of Color, FISCAL
POL’Y
INST.,
http://fiscalpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/April-2018.Final-Rent-Inequality-Brief.
pdf [https://perma.cc/9Z67-UPVD] (last visited Nov. 13, 2020) (finding that 31% of Latinx,
29% of Asian and all other, and 29% of Black families pay over 50% of their income on
rent, while that is true of just 19% of white families).
50. See NYU FURMAN CTR., supra note 47, at 25 (finding a 3.5% vacancy rate).
51. See Census ACS 1-Year Data Update, NYU FURMAN CTR. BLOG: THE STOOP (Sept.
27,
2019),
https://furmancenter.org/thestoop/entry/census-acs-1-year-data-update
[https://perma.cc/TQN5-VKU9].
52. See NYU FURMAN CTR., supra note 47, at 23.
53. See Kim Barker et al., The Eviction Machine Churning Through New York City,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
20,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/20/nyregion/nyc-affordable-housing.html
[https://perma.cc/6P57-MUTG].
54. In 2010, only 2% of tenants in eviction cases were represented. At the end of the
fiscal year 2019, 32% of tenants citywide and 62% of people living in Right to Counsel
(RTC) zip codes were represented. Oksana Mironova, Right to Counsel and Stronger Rent
Laws Helped Reduce Evictions in 2019, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://www.cssny.org/news/entry/right-to-counsel-and-stronger-rent-laws-helped-reduce-ev
ictions-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/9U4W-YVHT]. Evictions in RTC zip codes decreased by
29% between 2017 and 2019; evictions in non-RTC zip codes decreased by 16%. Id.
55. See NYU FURMAN CTR., supra note 47, at 9.
56. See Mironova, Race and Evictions, supra note 25; Basic Facts About Homelessness:
New
York
City,
COAL.
FOR
HOMELESS,
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B. Beyond Supply and Demand: Why Rents Are Too High
Policymakers often regard New York City’s affordability crisis57 simply
as a matter of supply and demand,58 but the incredible market pressure of
New York City’s real estate market is shaped by more than the total
number of units and the number of New Yorkers seeking apartments. For
example, City zoning decisions have often increased market pressure and
made neighborhoods less affordable even as they have increased the supply
of housing. 59 Mayor Bloomberg’s rezonings largely upzoned 60 lowerincome neighborhoods of color, causing an increase in property values and

https://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/basic-facts-about-homelessness-new-york-city/
[https://perma.cc/6ASU-T9LR] (last visited Sept. 7, 2020).
57. Madden and Marcuse warn against using the word “crisis” too lightly:
[W]e need to be careful with this usage of the concept of crisis. The idea of crisis
implies that inadequate or unaffordable housing is abnormal, a temporary
departure from a well-functioning standard. But for working-class and poor
communities, housing crisis is the norm. . . . For the oppressed, housing is always
in crisis.
DAVID MADDEN & PETER MARCUSE, IN DEFENSE OF HOUSING: THE POLITICS OF CRISIS 9–10
(2016).
58. In 2018, for example, Mayor de Blasio made the common argument that
development of market-rate apartments drives down rent overall:
The scarcity of housing [in gentrifying neighborhoods like Bed Stuy and
Bushwick] actually exacerbated the displacement . . . . If you’re not adding to the
supply, you have a pressured supply of housing, more and more people want to be
there — of course that creates a massive displacement pressure. We’ve got to have
an honest conversation in this city. If people think that no rezoning will just freeze
paradise in place and everything is going to be wonderful, that is a fundamental
misunderstanding of the last 20 years in this city.
Benjamin Dulchin, Does Trickle-Down Affordability Justify the Mayor’s Zoning Policy?,
ASS’N
FOR
NEIGHBORHOOD
&
HOUS.
DEV.
(Jan.
24,
2019),
https://www.anhd.org/blog/does-trickle-down-affordability-justify-mayors-zoning-policy
[https://perma.cc/9X5Q-HW3A].
59. See generally Tom Angotti, Introduction, in ZONED OUT!: RACE, DISPLACEMENT,
AND CITY PLANNING IN NEW YORK CITY 10 (Tom Angotti & Sylvia Morse eds., 2016).
60. Upzonings increase “the amount of square feet of building that can be developed,”
for example, by increasing the allowable height. Tom Angotti, Land Use and Zoning
Matter, in ZONED OUT!: RACE, DISPLACEMENT, AND CITY PLANNING IN NEW YORK CITY 18,
21 (Tom Angotti & Sylvia Morse eds., 2016) [hereinafter Angotti, Land Use and Zoning
Matter]. This automatically multiplies the number of housing units permitted to be
developed, which multiplies the amount of rent a building produces and therefore increasing
the value of the land it sits on. See id. at 21–23; see also What is Zoning?: New York City
Edition,
CTR.
FOR
URB.
PEDAGOGY
42–57
(2013),
http://welcometocup.org/file_columns/0000/0530/cup-whatiszoning-guidebook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C555-U25A].

266

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

rents. 61 Upzoning increases the supply of housing units which, under a
traditional economic supply and demand analysis, should decrease rents.62
But by increasing the development potential for individual lots and
incentivizing higher-rent construction, upzoning in a hot market ultimately
increases rents across the board.63
Another reason that increasing New York City’s housing supply has not
translated to lower rents is that the City’s ever-increasing property values
attract investors from around the world to use the City’s real estate as an
investment vehicle.64 And policy changes such as deregulation of housing
finance have further encouraged the commodification of New York City’s
housing stock. 65 Policymakers nonetheless continue to argue that
increasing the City’s supply of housing — regardless of how expensive the
rents are set — will necessarily drive rents down overall.66 To the contrary,
rents have increased year over year, often dramatically.67 And New York’s
historically weak rent regulation laws have meant that even rent-stabilized
units have often been affected.68
While the real estate market in New York City largely comprises a web
of complicated policies, supply and demand overlay that web and drive the
market up further. At 8.3 million inhabitants and averaging 27,000 people
per square mile, 69 New York City is the largest and densest city in the

61. See Angotti, Land Use and Zoning Matter, supra note 60, at 23. Increased property
values raise rents for tenants (in the case of upzoned neighborhoods, most often tenants of
color) as they increase profits for landlords, who are disproportionately white men. See id.
62. See id. at 27.
63. See id. at 29–30.
64. See SAMUEL STEIN, CAPITAL CITY: GENTRIFICATION AND THE REAL ESTATE STATE 2–
3 (2019); John Whitlow, Gentrification and Countermovement: The Right to Counsel and
New York City’s Affordable Housing Crisis, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1081, 1099 (2019).
65. See MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 57, at 26–29.
66. See Angotti, Land Use and Zoning Matter, supra note 60, at 27 (recounting the
comments of former New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development
Commissioner Vicki Been about the proposed rezoning of East New York); Dulchin, supra
note 58.
67. Prior to June of 2019, the City’s rent-stabilized units, home to 2.4 million people,
faced decades of eroding protections and loss of units. See Luis Ferre-Sadurni et al.,
Landmark Deal Reached on Rent Protections for Tenants in N.Y., N.Y. TIMES (June 11,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/nyregion/rent-protection-regulation.html
[https://perma.cc/7992-L74S]. Since the 2019 law, rent-stabilized units are much more
tightly controlled, but the 43% of units that are unregulated still are not. See Housing Types,
N.Y.C.
RENT
GUIDELINES
BD.,
https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/resources/apartment-hunting/housing-types/
[https://perma.cc/9SP6-FAYN] (last visited Aug. 30, 2020).
68. See Ferre-Sadurni et al., supra note 67.
69. QuickFacts: New York City, New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/newyorkcitynewyork
[https://perma.cc/RFE5-DEVN]
(last visited June 28, 2020).
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United States.70 The number of people who want to live in the City and the
limited amount of land available for housing both add to market pressure as
well. The above policies, however, go at least as far in ensuring that for
most New Yorkers, the rent is too high.
C. Recent Changes to New York State’s Rent Laws and Regulation
Market pressure on rents has disempowered tenants, and New York
State’s longstanding system of inadequate protections for renters and rent
regulation failed to stop it. Up until recent state rent reforms, tenant
disempowerment — the lack of ability to choose where to live or whether
to stay — worsened year after year in New York City. A new set of rent
laws passed in 2019 dramatically improved the situation for tenants, but
decades under the former system shaped the current landscape.71
Because the City’s and State’s former rent laws enabled landlords to
squeeze more and more profit out of residential rental buildings, they did
just that.72 Unregulated rental units, which account for about 43% of the
City’s rental units, have no limits on rent increases.73 For these “marketrate” units, landlords may increase the rent by any amount whenever a new
lease is signed. 74 Most of the City’s below-market rent apartments,
however, are rent-regulated, 75 and these account for 46% of the City’s
rentals. 76 Because rent-stabilized units form the backbone of affordable
units in New York City, the decline in rent stabilization in recent decades
was especially devastating to low-income New Yorkers.
The amount by which landlords of rent-stabilized apartments may
increase the rent in each lease is set by the New York City Rent Guidelines

70. See Mike Maciag, Mapping the Nation’s Most Densely Populated Cities,
GOVERNING
(Oct.
2,
2013),
https://www.governing.com/blogs/by-the-numbers/most-densely-populated-cities-data-map.
html [https://perma.cc/QVH6-PXHA].
71. See infra Section I.E.
72. See Barker, supra note 18.
73. See Housing Types, supra note 67.
74. See id.
75. A few are rent controlled, but almost all are rent stabilized. See JESSICA YAGER,
NYU FURMAN CTR., THE CHALLENGE OF RISING RENTS: EXPLORING WHETHER A NEW TAX
BENEFIT COULD HELP KEEP UNSUBSIDIZED RENTAL UNITS AFFORDABLE 7 (2015),
https://furmancenter.org/files/fact-sheets/NYUFurmanCenter_ChallengeofRisingRents_10J
UN2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLH8-L9CC] (finding that over two-thirds of units
affordable to families making 80% of the area median income or less are in multifamily
buildings with at least five units, and over 90% of those are rent controlled or stabilized).
76. See Housing Types, supra note 67 (one million units are rent stabilized, while
27,000 are rent controlled).
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Board (RGB) every year. 77 The rents for rent-stabilized apartments are
thus intended to increase only incrementally over time. However, prior to
the recent rent reforms, several mechanisms in the law allowed landlords to
raise rent by much larger amounts than the RGB increment. These
mechanisms included a 20% “vacancy bonus” the landlord could add to the
prior rent whenever a tenant moved out,78 and additional rent increases on
top of that for claimed renovations.79 Further, landlords could deregulate
rent-stabilized units that reached a certain rent threshold, thus taking them
out of regulation completely.80
Because market-rate rents increased so much faster than the RGB rent
increase amounts in the last 30 years, landlords were especially motivated
to deregulate rent-stabilized units in order to raise rents without limit and
maximize income.81 And because the primary mechanisms for increasing
regulated rents beyond the RGB amount required a change in tenants,
landlords had a strong economic motivation to push tenants out.82 The lack
of a right to counsel for tenants until 201783 and the precarious economic
position of many rent-stabilized tenants — specifically Black and Latinx
tenants84 — created a large power difference between landlords and tenants.
All of these factors led to scores of evictions.85 In addition to using the

77. Each year, the NYC Rent Guidelines Board establishes the percentage by which the
rent in rent-stabilized units may be increased. See Explanation of the Rent Guidelines
Process,
N.Y.C.
RENT
GUIDELINES
BD.,
https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/rent-guidelines/explanation-of-the-rent-guideli
nes-process/ [https://perma.cc/UQ64-DNUV] (last visited Aug. 30, 2020). The Board
considers factors such as building maintenance costs and cost of living indices. See id. The
increases for one-year leases for the past ten years have been between 0%–4%. See Rent
Guidelines Board Apartment Orders #1 Through #51 (1969 to 2020), N.Y.C. RENT
GUIDELINES
BD.,
https://rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/aptorders.pdf
[https://perma.cc/67VU-S4NQ] (last visited Nov. 13, 2020).
78. See Strengthening New York State Rent Regulations: The Housing Stability and
Tenant Protection Act of 2019, N.Y. ST. HOMES & CMTY. RENEWAL 8 (2020),
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2020/02/rent-regulation-hstpa-presentation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SD8Q-D8U8].
79. See id. at 10–11.
80. See id. at 7.
81. See Barker, supra note 18.
82. See Barker et al., supra note 53.
83. See Oksana Mironova, NYC Right to Counsel: First Year Results and Potential for
Expansion,
CMTY.
SERV.
SOC’Y
(Mar.
25,
2019),
https://www.cssny.org/news/entry/nyc-right-to-counsel. [https://perma.cc/DL75-AXB8].
84. Because of the racial disparities in rent burden, eviction, and homelessness (which
are related processes, but each imposes additional layers of systemic racism), the loss in
affordability directly leads to the displacement of Black and Latinx New Yorkers from their
neighborhoods.
85. See Barker et al., supra note 53.
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courts, landlords also used illegal tactics like harassment, intimidation, and
fraud to push tenants out.86
The ensuing crisis in evictions and displacement led to several
substantial reforms in recent years. These reforms have included a right to
counsel for low-income New Yorkers facing eviction 87 and a slew of
strengthened New York State rent regulations that passed in June 2019.88
However, rents have long since exceeded what average New Yorkers can
afford to pay, and the new laws are not designed to scale back the
affordability crisis.89 Until more housing is created that can shield tenants
from market pressures, tenant disempowerment will continue.
D. Projected Impacts of Rent Reform and COVID-19
The rental housing landscape in New York City is in the midst of major
changes. The real estate market effects of two events — the 2019 rent
reforms and the COVID-19 economic downturn — are still emerging.
New York State passed new rent laws90 in 2019 that increased protections
for tenants and limited rent increases. 91 These changes mean that rentstabilized multifamily building owners have less potential for profit than
they did before the law. And the economic downturn in New York City
during the COVID-19 pandemic 92 may even further depress real estate
prices. While the exact effects are still becoming clear, the preliminary
evidence points to a softer real estate market in coming years.
By removing most legal mechanisms for deregulating rent-stabilized
units, the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA)

86. See id.
87. See Providing Legal Services for Tenants Who Are Subject to Eviction Proceedings,
N.Y.
CITY
COUNCIL
(Aug.
11,
2017),
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1687978&GUID=29A4594B-9E
8A-4C5E-A797-96BDC4F64F80 [https://perma.cc/5MTG-VZPU].
88. See Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act, 2019 Sess. Law News of N.Y.
Legis. Memo. Ch. 36 (McKinney 2019).
89. While the 2019 laws brought “an end to big rent increases,” they did not decrease
existing rents. See Sharon Otterman & Matthew Haag, Rent Regulations in New York: How
They’ll Affect Tenants and Landlords, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/nyregion/rent-regulation-laws-new-york.html
[https://perma.cc/3BRC-5Q47].
90. See Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act Ch. 36.
91. See Georgia Kromrei & Kathryn Brenzel, The Rent Law, One Year Later: “No
Upside, No Opportunity,” REAL DEAL (June 12, 2020, 12:47 PM),
https://therealdeal.com/2020/06/12/the-rent-law-one-year-later-no-upside-no-opportunity/
[https://perma.cc/VSG5-CNC3].
92. See N.Y.C. Economic Summary, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Sept. 18, 2020),
https://www.bls.gov/regions/new-york-new-jersey/summary/blssummary_newyorkcity.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ALG5-R3MH].
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almost entirely put an end to the rampant loss of rent-stabilized units.93
New York law previously permitted several ways for landlords to increase
the rent of a rent-stabilized unit.94 And upon raising the rent to a certain
threshold level, the landlord was permitted to take the unit out of rent
stabilization altogether. 95 By allowing landlords to hike rents on rentstabilized units this way, the previous system not only led to an overall loss
in affordable units in New York City, but it also drove up the price of rentstabilized multifamily buildings. 96 By eliminating most of those
mechanisms for increasing rent, and thus decreasing landlords’ profit
potential, the 2019 law will likely affect the market for rent-stabilized
multifamily buildings.
Prior to the 2019 reforms, some banks further encouraged rent
deregulation through their lending practices. In order to profit on the
additional loan interest, banks provided loans to landlords to buy rentstabilized multifamily rental buildings at inflated prices, based on their
potential rental value, rather than their actual existing rental value.97 For
example, if the rents in a rent-stabilized building at the time of sale brought
in $10,000 each month, the bank would nonetheless issue a mortgage that
would require rents of $15,000 per month. The landlord would then have
to use the eviction and deregulation process described above to increase
rental income to pay the debt. Banks had the incentive to profit on the
extra interest from the inflated loan, and landlords believed that they would
be able to sell the building at an even higher price after deregulating the
rents. Now that deregulation is no longer legal even when tenants cycle
through, landlords who speculatively purchased these buildings intending
to increase rents dramatically by pushing low-paying tenants out will no
longer be able to do so. These overleveraged landlords are now likelier
than their peers — who did not purchase at inflated prices — to find
themselves in a financially precarious position.
So far, the clearest measurable effect of HSTPA98 on the rent-stabilized,
multifamily real estate market is that sales have slowed dramatically. 99

93. See Barker, supra note 18 (documenting the extensive loss of rent stabilized units
leading up to the 2019 rent reform laws); Ferre-Sadurni et al., supra note 67 (outlining the
changes brought by HSTPA).
94. See supra Section I.C.
95. See Strengthening New York State Rent Regulations, supra note 78, at 7.
96. See Barker, supra note 18.
97. Housing’s exchange value as a vehicle for capital accumulation overcame its use
value as a home. See Whitlow, supra note 64, at 1099.
98. Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act, 2019 Sess. Law News of N.Y. Legis.
Memo. Ch. 36 (McKinney 2019).
99. Multifamily building sales dramatically slowed down in the last year, either because
owners were waiting to see if the laws would stay, or because they were unwilling to sell at
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Uninterested in selling during a market slowdown, or possibly waiting to
see if the 2019 law will persist, fewer apartment building owners have tried
to sell in the past year.100 The relative lack of sales means that the data on
whether and to what extent multifamily — especially rent stabilized —
building prices in New York City have decreased is not yet conclusive.101
However, the data has started to show a decrease in building prices and an
increase in capitalization rates.102 But overall, although over a year has
passed since HSTPA passed, the ultimate impact is not clear yet.
Likewise, there has not been enough data to see how the COVID-19
pandemic will additionally affect the market for apartment buildings in
New York City. Even though the real estate business in New York City
almost completely stopped at the beginning of the pandemic, 103 many
predicted that the residential rental market might recover quickly from the

a price much lower than what they had paid. See Eliza Theiss, NYC Multifamily Sales
Volume
Surges
in
Q1,
PROPERTYSHARK
(Apr.
15,
2020),
https://www.propertyshark.com/Real-Estate-Reports/NYC-multifamily-sales
[https://perma.cc/9AUA-2GB4]; see also Akiko Matsuda, New York’s Multifamily Sales
Improve
in
Q3,
REAL
DEAL
(Oct.
23,
2020,
6:30
PM),
https://therealdeal.com/2020/10/23/new-yorks-multifamily-sales-improve-in-q3/
[https://perma.cc/W2W2-B2FE]
100. See Theiss, supra note 99.
101. There have not been enough sales to gauge market-level changes in the current
values of multifamily buildings, but there are indicators that for rent-regulated buildings that
have sold, prices may be down. One very large sale in Queens in late 2019 showed a 38%
decrease in price. See Georgia Kromrei & Rich Bockman, A&E Real Estate Buys Huge
Rent-Stabilized Portfolio at Deep Discount, REAL DEAL (Nov. 19, 2019, 4:11 PM),
https://therealdeal.com/2019/11/19/ae-real-estate-buys-massive-rent-stabilized-portfolio-at-s
teep-discount/ [https://perma.cc/BS59-55NU]; see also Kromrei & Brenzel, supra note 91
(“One of the few quantifiable impacts so far has been a decline in deal volume. Since the
law eliminated nearly all pathways to raising rents, large transactions have been rare.”).
102. A commercial real estate company that creates quarterly reports on multifamily real
estate sales in New York City shows that average price per unit and price per square foot
decreased in 2020 over 2019. See ARIEL PROP. ADVISORS, MULTIFAMILY QUARTER IN
REVIEW:
NEW
YORK
CITY
Q3
2020,
at
4
(2020),
http://arielpa.com/report/report-MFQIR-Q3-2020
[https://perma.cc/ME9F-S5TZ]. The
capitalization rate is a ratio that measures a building’s purchase price relative to its current
net income — lower “cap rates” indicate aggressive investments, where the purchaser is
banking on a higher return in the future. The capitalization rate is the net operating income
divided by the purchase price. An increase in the cap rate of recent multifamily property
sales indicates that the price at which buyers are willing to purchase these buildings has
decreased. See Georgia Kromrei, Managing the Rent Law Aftershocks, REAL DEAL (Jan. 2,
2020,
10:00
AM),
https://therealdeal.com/issues_articles/managing-the-rent-law-aftershocks/
[https://perma.cc/A66M-RSA4]. The Ariel Property Advisors report also shows that cap
rates were up in 2020 over 2019. See ARIEL PROP. ADVISORS, supra note 102, at 4.
103. Construction workers, brokers, appraisers, and inspectors were all affected by the
stay at home order. See How the Coronavirus Crisis Is Gutting Real Estate, REAL DEAL
(Apr. 1, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://therealdeal.com/issues_articles/an-era-of-pestilence/
[https://perma.cc/E9DX-J372].
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acute crisis.104 The magnitude of this hit to the economy, however, may
challenge conventional wisdom. 105 Irrespective of the overall effect,
overleveraged landlords will be at risk the most for loan defaults.106 Not
only were their plans to legally hike rents halted by HSPTA, but rental
income for these landlords decreased due to widespread unemployment,
especially after the CARES Act supplemental federal unemployment
checks stopped at the end of July. 107 Federal and state mortgage relief
plans for certain buildings have likely masked this effect, but the coming
months may show clearer signs of distress.108
While the effects of the HSTPA and the COVID-19 pandemic on the
rental building market are not clear yet, decreased apartment building
prices and an increase in overleveraged loan defaults are both expected in
the coming months and years.109
E. What We Have Already Tried: Traditional Affordable Housing
Development Policy
Housing policy at all levels of government aims to expand supply and
increase affordability and quality of housing.110 Housing policy targeting
affordability can take several forms, including vouchers to help tenants pay
rent, subsidies for developers to build and renovate, and tax incentives for
investors in new housing. 111 Since the early 1980s, federal housing
expenditures have been cut back sharply.112 Meanwhile, remaining federal
resources have increasingly benefited a particular subset of the housing

104. The residential rental market may fare better than commercial, office, and hotel real
estate markets, all of which are likely to be more affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and
economic downturn. See Kathryn Brenzel, Not So Fast, Vultures: Multifamily Among Better
“Food Groups” Poised to Weather Pandemic, REAL DEAL (Apr. 8, 2020, 5:00 PM),
https://therealdeal.com/2020/04/08/not-so-fast-vultures-multifamily-among-better-food-gro
ups-poised-to-weather-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/4QGL-JP3C].
105. See Patrick Sisson, What Your Landlord Thinks About Rent Right Now, CURBED
(Apr.
10,
2020),
https://www.curbed.com/2020/3/31/21197368/coronavirus-rent-mortgage-landlord-apartme
nt [https://perma.cc/VAK2-T8G5].
106. See Brenzel, supra note 104.
107. See Samantha Fields, U.S. Looking at “a Tsunami of Evictions” as Moratoriums
Expire,
MARKETPLACE
(May
29,
2020),
https://www.marketplace.org/2020/05/29/u-s-looking-at-a-tsunami-of-evictions-as-moratori
ums-expire/ [https://perma.cc/M2QZ-ZMXJ].
108. See Kromrei, Managing the Rent Law Aftershocks, supra note 102.
109. See id.
110. See ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (3d ed. 2015).
111. See id. at 7.
112. See id. at 265.

2020]

HOUSING FOR THE PEOPLE

273

ecosystem: homeowners 113 and rental housing developers. 114 Where
federal subsidy previously directly funded new affordable housing
construction, remaining federal funds for new construction of low-income
housing are now largely directed through tax incentives to investors.115 By
prioritizing funding for property owners, the benefit for renters is indirect
and only reaches them after profit is siphoned off.
As direct federal subsidies for new housing have receded, 116 city and
state governments have had to fill the gap, and housing programs are now
even more reliant on private development with public incentives.117 For
the last several decades, housing programs in New York City have focused
primarily on partnerships that seek to leverage private investment to create
some affordable units in privately owned buildings.118 Critics have pointed
out that this strategy leads to too few “affordable” units, with rents that are
often not affordable enough for those who need them, 119 and that are
affordable only temporarily.120
New York City cobbles together funding from city, state, and federal
sources to incentivize developers to build affordable housing. Developers
who agree to set rents below the market rate are also forgoing income, so
the government offers a subsidy to incentivize the developer to create more

113. For example, the largest federal housing subsidy, the mortgage interest deduction, is
dedicated to homeowners. See Jenny Schuetz, Under U.S. Housing Policies, Homeowners
Mostly Win, While Renters Mostly Lose, BROOKINGS INST. (July 10, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/under-us-housing-policies-homeowners-mostly-win-wh
ile-renters-mostly-lose/ [https://perma.cc/6WPH-P6W9]. Due to the 2017 federal tax
reforms, the cost of the mortgage interest deduction has now fallen to about $27 billion. See
JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-55-19, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS
2019–2023,
at
23
(2019),
https://www.jct.gov/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=71b5ac20-f36a-46fb-9def-f7194212e84
9 [https://perma.cc/34CB-F8U8].
114. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 110, at 7.
115. See Schuetz, supra note 113.
116. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 110, at 54–56, 265. While U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) outlays have steadily increased since the 1970s, budget
authority was cut dramatically by the Reagan Administration in the 1980s. See id. at 55. The
major result of that cut was that HUD funding has increasingly gone to renewals of existing
subsidized housing contracts rather than to subsidies for additional households. See id. at 56.
Some federal funding was directed to block grants for states and localities, but a significant
gap developed, which cities and states have had to fill by finding new funding sources for
low-income housing. See id.
117. See id. at 265–66; Reina, supra note 40, at 1268.
118. See Mironova & Waters, Social Housing, supra note 31.
119. See OFF. OF N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, supra note 25, at 11–12.
120. See OKSANA MIRONOVA, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y, CLOSING THE DOOR: SUBSIDIZED
HOUSING AT A TIME OF FEDERAL INSTABILITY 2 (2018) [hereinafter CLOSING THE DOOR],
https://smhttp-ssl-58547.nexcesscdn.net/nycss/images/uploads/pubs/Closing_the_Door_FIN
AL_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7FU-FBKP].
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affordability. The affordability side of the equation has three dimensions
that can trade-off of one another: how far below the market rate the rents
are set, how long they are guaranteed at that level, and the overall number
of affordable units in a building.121
For example, by offering a certain amount of subsidy, the government
may be able to incentivize a developer to construct a building with rents set
in 100% of its 30 units to be affordable to middle-income New Yorkers for
30 years. In order to make those units affordable for more than 30 years
and still finance the building with the same amount of subsidy, the
developer may have to cut back on the number of affordable units —
perhaps resulting in only 24 of the units being affordable to middle-income
New Yorkers for 40 years. Likewise, to make the rents affordable to lowincome or very low-income New Yorkers with the same subsidy, the
developer may decrease the number of affordable units or shorten the
length of time the rents would be affordable. In order to lower the rent for
those units from $2,400 to $1,600, for example, the developer would have
to decrease the number of affordable units even more or cut the amount of
time they would be affordable.
To incentivize developers to increase affordability by any of these
metrics, the government offers more subsidy, often in the form of tax
incentives. 122 To push developers to offer more units, lower rents, or
affordability for longer time periods would require that the City offer even
more subsidy.123 Subsidized units for the lowest-income New Yorkers are
thus especially scarce.124 And because “affordable” rents are determined
by a federal metric 125 that does not reflect most New York City

121. See generally Mironova & Waters, Social Housing, supra note 31; see also SOSA,
supra note 32, at 6–11
122. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program, for example, makes up the biggest
segment of privately owned subsidized housing in New York City. See CLOSING THE DOOR,
supra note 120, at 3–4.
123. Arguably, achieving deeper affordability would require that the City offer ongoing
operating subsidies in addition to the initial capital subsidies most housing programs rely on
at present. See Mironova & Waters, Social Housing, supra note 31.
124. See OFF. OF N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, supra note 25, at 2–3.
125. Depth of affordability is designated in terms of area median income (AMI), which is
a metric set at the federal level by HUD. See Affordable Housing: Area Median Income,
N.Y.C.
DEP’T
HOUS.
PRES.
&
DEV.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/services-and-information/area-median-income.page
[https://perma.cc/XY32-QSH8] (last visited Sept. 19, 2020). A family of three that meets the
median income for NYC’s area makes $102,400, so a unit considered affordable for that
family would be set at 100% AMI. See id. A two-bedroom rent at 100% AMI is $2,467,
which is determined by assuming that families spent 30% of their income on rent. See id.
Families whose income is at 51%–80% AMI are considered low income; 31%–50% is
considered very low income, and 0%–30% is considered extremely low income. See id. A
two-bedroom apartment set at 50% AMI would have a rent of $1,110, and at 30% it would
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neighborhoods, much of subsidized “affordable housing” in the City ends
up targeting renters who can afford market-rate rents — that is, not the
renters who need it.126
Most government-supported affordable housing developments in New
York City for the last several decades have used the profit-seeking, publicprivate partnership model.127 Programs such as Mitchell-Lama rentals and
cooperatives, 128 Housing Development Finance Corporation (HDFC)
cooperatives, 129 and community land trusts (CLTs), however, have
prioritized other goals such as permanent affordability, democratic resident
control, and social equity.130
These models have each reduced or removed the owner’s profit motive
by lessening the effect of market pressure; that is, they are
“decommodified.” 131 In each case, the market’s influence is limited by
restrictions on owner profit, unit resale price, or rent levels. The “LimitedProfit Housing Companies” section of New York’s Private Housing
Finance Law132 permits private companies to develop and own MitchellLama rentals, but the private companies are limited in the amount of profit

be $598. See id. Many have harshly criticized that the City’s incentives and subsidies are set
using the AMI system because HUD sets AMI based on New York City’s metropolitan area,
which includes wealthy suburbs. See Jarrett Murphy, The Secret History of AMI, CITY
LIMITS (Feb. 17, 2016), https://citylimits.org/2016/02/17/the-secret-history-of-ami/
[https://perma.cc/4NKE-WSPZ]. The majority of neighborhoods in New York City thus
have average incomes well below the citywide AMI, so even “affordable” units set for
renters who make 60%–80% of the AMI are not helpful for struggling renters in those
neighborhoods. See id.
126. See OFF. OF N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, supra note 25, at 2–3.
127. See BROMLEY ET AL., supra note 16, at 89.
128. See Oksana Mironova & Thomas J. Waters, How Social Is That Housing?, CMTY.
SERV. SOC’Y (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.cssny.org/news/entry/how-social-is-that-housing
[https://perma.cc/M638-7VGP]. Active from 1955–1974, the Mitchell-Lama program
incentivized development of cooperatives and rentals for moderate-income people in New
York State. See id. Mitchell-Lama cooperatives cannot be sold on the open market. See id.
However, the affordability requirements are temporary, so some Mitchell-Lama cooperative
buildings have opted to privatize after those requirements end. See id.
129. See id. The HDFC cooperative program, named for the Housing Development Fund
Corporation article in New York State’s Private Housing Finance Law, is the City’s primary
tenant ownership program. While few new HDFC cooperatives are still created, historically
it has given tenants in buildings with tax-delinquent landlords the opportunity to form an
affordable cooperative and take ownership. See New York City Housing Development
Finance Corporation Act, N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW ch. 44B, art. XII (McKinney 2020);
DEP’T
HOUS.
PRES.
&
DEV.,
HDFC
Cooperatives,
N.Y.C.
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/services-and-information/hdfc.page
[https://perma.cc/8G7L-87EZ] (last visited Oct. 28, 2020).
130. See Mironova & Waters, Social Housing, supra note 31. These programs draw on
elements of “social housing,” which this Notes discusses in Part III.
131. See Mironova & Waters, How Social Is That Housing?, supra note 128.
132. N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 10 (McKinney 2020).
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they can make, and rents are regulated as well.133 HDFC cooperatives are
resident-owned, but there are restrictions on resales designed to keep the
units affordable, and to limit the ability of residents to make more than a
modest profit on a sale.134 And CLTs both put the land into a trust that
removes it from the speculative market and impose permanent affordability
restrictions (through rent restrictions or profit caps, if for cooperatives).135
While these models respond to the shortcomings of the more typical publicprivate partnership programs described above, they are also difficult to
expand given current limitations: Mitchell-Lama and HDFC cooperatives
are rarely created,136 and New York City has only a handful of CLTs, with
new developments only slowly gaining ground.137
While nonprofit-owned rentals are relatively sheltered from market
pressure because nonprofit organizations are structurally prohibited from
turning a profit for directors as for-profit companies do,138 they frequently
still have the affordability shortcomings described above. At the same
time, nonprofit developers who receive city financial assistance to develop
affordable rental housing create more public benefit than for-profit
developers.139

133. See Mironova & Waters, How Social Is That Housing?, supra note 128.
134. Under the Private Housing Finance Law, all HDFC cooperatives have a limit on
resale buyers’ incomes. See Fact Sheet for Cooperative HDFC Shareholders, N.Y.C. DEP’T
HOUS.
PRES.
&
DEV.
(Sept.
2019),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/services/hdfc-coop-fact-sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/52FF-KVRS]. Most HDFC cooperatives sales, additionally, are subject to
a flip tax, which divides the profit between the shareholder and the HDFC board (and
sometimes the City). See id. Certain HDFC cooperatives also cap resale price. See id.
Despite these restrictions explicitly designed to prevent the incentive to use HDFC
cooperatives as investment vehicles, a small number of HDFC cooperatives have been sold
for very high prices. See infra Section II.C.i.
135. CLTs are “nonprofit, democratically governed organizations that steward land to
meet community needs.” Mironova & Waters, How Social Is That Housing?, supra note
128. They are among the least commodified of New York City housing models, due to a
land ownership structure that minimizes market pressure on land costs, nonprofit ownership
that ensures affordability, and democratic control by residents, whether individually or
collectively as cooperative owners. See id.
136. See TOM WATERS & VICTOR BACH, COMMUNITY SERV. SOC’Y OF N.Y., REINVENTING
THE
MITCHELL-LAMA
HOUSING
PROGRAM
3
(2015),
https://smhttp-ssl-58547.nexcesscdn.net/nycss/images/uploads/pubs/CSS_MLPB%20%20Fi
nal.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DRC-69VD].
137. Two CLTs currently exist in New York City (with about 12 more in development).
See Mironova & Waters, How Social Is That Housing?, supra note 128.
138. Nonprofit rentals have a requirement to distribute any profit back into the purpose of
the organization See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 515(a) (McKinney 2015).
139. See Stephanie Sosa, The For-Profitization of Affordable Housing Development and
the de Blasio Plan, ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV. 9–12 (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://anhd.org/report/profitization-affordable-housing-development-and-de-blasio-plan
[https://perma.cc/87ZE-3BJ3].
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New York City therefore faces this problem: while some New York City
housing programs have addressed major shortcomings of the prevailing
housing plan for the City, these are precisely the models that are most
difficult to expand given current land, funding, and policy constraints.
II. SOURCES FOR A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
This Part explains the right of first purchase and its potential
contribution to improving housing affordability in New York City, given
the current legal, political, and economic conditions. Then it will lay out
how other jurisdictions use purchase opportunity laws and how they can
serve as possible bases for a similar law in New York City. This Part will
then discuss other New York City housing programs relevant to the
possible development of a purchase opportunity law.
A. TOPA Laws: Background
By providing tenants a first right to purchase their building, a tenant
opportunity to purchase law holds promise to create a much-needed
pipeline of deeply affordable housing in New York City. As a broadbased, passive mechanism for turning rental apartment buildings on the
speculative market into tenant-directed, affordable housing at the point of
ownership change, it is unusually well-positioned to address New York
City’s current challenges, opportunities, and risks.
TOPA laws impart a first right of purchase to tenants.140 A first right of
purchase, generally, “gives a potential purchaser the opportunity to
purchase before a property is sold to another.”141 If a landlord decides to
sell their building, whoever holds the first right of purchase has the first
chance to buy it. That first chance may include a right of first refusal or a
right of first offer.142 A right of first offer requires the seller to offer the
right holder to buy the building before publicly listing it,143 and the right of
first refusal requires that the seller allow the right holder to match any offer

140. See Julie Gilgoff, Giving Tenants the First Opportunity to Purchase Their Homes,
SHELTERFORCE
(July
24,
2020),
https://shelterforce.org/2020/07/24/giving-tenants-the-first-opportunity-to-purchase-their-ho
mes/ [https://perma.cc/XR4H-SJ2W].
141. Rights of First Purchase (Offer, Negotiation and Refusal), WECONSERVEPA:
CONSERVATIONTOOLS,
https://conservationtools.org/guides/24-rights-of-first-purchase-offer-negotiation-and-refusa
l [https://perma.cc/C5A6-6E4X] (last visited Sept. 28, 2020).
142. See id.
143. See 92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser § 180 (1955).
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from a third party, and take precedence over it.144 These rights can apply to
any kind of property but are most frequently used with real property.145
This Note examines a first right of purchase as a statutory146 provision
specifically related to rental apartment buildings. While many state and
local governments use this type of “purchase opportunity” law to intervene
when government-subsidized housing reaches the end of its regulatory
period,147 or where rentals are to be converted to condominiums,148 it is less
often used in a broad-based way to pull rental housing into tenant or
nonprofit ownership.149 The most prominent example of the latter type of
purchase opportunity law is Washington, D.C.’s TOPA,150 which gives a
first right of purchase to the tenants when landlords put their building up
for sale.151 Under D.C.’s TOPA law, tenants also gain the right to assign
their purchase right to another party, such as a nonprofit developer.152
Used as an affordable housing preservation tool, as in Washington, D.C.,
the TOPA law can both prevent immediate displacement and keep the rents
for the units themselves low.153 By empowering tenants instead of new
landlords to take ownership, this policy can avert rent increases and
evictions. 154 Because buying and rehabilitating existing apartment

144. See id.
145. See 3 ARTHUR LINCOLN CORBIN & ERIC MILLS HOLMES, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
11.3 (Joseph Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993).
146. Rights of first refusal, for example, are more commonly negotiated within individual
real estate transactions and not imposed by legislation across a span of properties. See id.
147. New York City has had a right of first refusal law for apartment buildings that are
leaving government-subsidized housing programs, including Mitchell-Lama and
Project-Based Section 8. See id. § 26-801.
148. See
Rights
of
First
Refusal,
LOC.
HOUS.
SOLS.,
https://www.localhousingsolutions.org/act/housing-policy-library/act-housing-policy-library
-rights-of-first-refusal-overview/act-housing-policy-library-rights-to-first-refusal-overview-r
ights-to-first-refusal/ [https://perma.cc/FNC3-S23E] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020).
149. See Peter Damrosch, Public Rights of First Refusal, 129 YALE L.J. 812, 819 (2020).
150. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-3404.01–.12 (West 2018).
151. “TOPA stipulates that owners of residential properties must ‘give the tenant an
opportunity to purchase the accommodation at a price and terms which represent a bona fide
offer of sale’ before they may transfer the property to a third party.” MICHAEL DIAMOND,
HARRISON INST. FOR PUB. LAW, AN ANALYSIS OF THE STRENGTHS AND DEFICIENCIES OF
WASHINGTON, D.C.’S TENANT OPPORTUNITY TO PURCHASE ACT 3 (2006),
https://docplayer.net/storage/39/19377974/1604527861/P7hwgEyWhKEb_Je0C3LP6A/193
77974.pdf [https://perma.cc/CVZ9-AL4V]. Right of first refusals can also be created for
governments. These public right of first refusals present a third option between eminent
domain and buying on the market. See Damrosch, supra note 149, at 816.
152. See DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 6.
153. See id. at 9.
154. See Jenny Reed, DC’s First Right Purchase Program Helps to Preserve Affordable
Housing and Is One of DC’s Key Anti-Displacement Tools, D.C. FISCAL POL’Y INST. 1
(2013),
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buildings is 25%–40% less expensive than new construction, 155 this
approach can also achieve deeper affordability than many traditional
housing subsidy programs.156 The right to assign their purchase right to
another party, or to negotiate for payment in lieu of purchase, gives tenants
a considerable amount of leverage at a juncture where they would
otherwise have little.157
However, from some angles, a statutory first right of purchase for
tenants also has downsides. From a current owner’s perspective, it imposes
the burden of regulatory costs and delays and a diminished ability to attract
buyers.158 And from the tenant’s or city’s perspective, TOPA as a housing
policy tool does not operate on the same timeline as eminent domain or
other acquisition or new development programs.159 Because TOPA laws
leave the timing of a sale completely in the hands of the property owner,
they are most effective as a policy tool only over long-term horizons.160
TOPA laws also bring different legal concerns than other housing policy
tools. When they apply broadly to residential real estate (as D.C.’s law
does), TOPA laws run the risk of takings clause challenges.161 TOPA laws
enacted at the city or state level may also create preemption issues. 162
However, a state-level TOPA law is likely to prevail over either of these
challenges; so long as the pricing mechanism is set properly, it is not likely
to face a successful constitutional challenge.163

https://www.dcfpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/9-24-13-First_Right_Purchase_Paper-Fi
nal.pdf [https://perma.cc/8R6V-GDGU].
155. See Reina, supra note 40, at 1282 n.85.
156. See Reed, supra note 154, at 5–6.
157. See DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 3; see also Carey L. Biron, How Washington, D.C.
Residents Are Tackling Rising Rents, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 22, 2018),
https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2018/0822/How-Washington-D.C.-residents-are-t
ackling-rising-rents [https://perma.cc/G4D8-LGHP ].
158. See Damrosch, supra note 149, at 847; see also David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights
of First Refusal, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 5 (1999). The additional requirement on the
owner to present this right to the tenants typically results in lower prices because potential
third-party buyers know that any offer they make could be matched by tenants (whose bid
automatically wins); they will bid less than they would otherwise, because of the time,
labor, and uncertainty. Damrosch suggests that cities could reimburse landlords for
unsuccessful bids. See Damrosch, supra note 149, at 846.
159. See Damrosch, supra note 149, at 840.
160. See id.
161. See A Brief Review of State and Local Preservation Purchase Laws, 36 HOUS. L.
BULL. 217, 224 (2006) (noting that although challenges may be raised, such laws “should
pass constitutional standards because they assure just compensation to owners”).
162. See Paula A. Franzese, Solutions to the Crisis in Affordable Housing: A Proposed
Model for New York City, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 84, 90 (2006).
163. See infra Section IV.B.
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B. TOPA Models from Other Jurisdictions
i. Washington, D.C.’s Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act
Washington, D.C.’s TOPA is the most prominent example of a broad
statutory first right of purchase for tenants. TOPA, passed by the D.C.
Council in the early 1980s, requires that owners of residential properties
“give the tenants an opportunity to purchase the accommodation at a price
and terms which represent a bona fide offer of sale.” 164 Tenants can
exercise this right in several ways. They may buy the building and create
limited-equity cooperatives (LECs), for example, or assign or sell their
right to a third party.165 If tenants choose to assign their right to a nonprofit
developer, they can co-develop the property to create, for example,
subsidized low-income rental housing.166 Tenants in D.C. may also opt to
partner with for-profit developers who may develop the building into
market-rate rentals or condominiums, offering current residents a discount
in rent or an option to buy in.167 Under the D.C. law, tenants may also opt
to take a cash payment from the landlord in exchange for choosing not to
exercise their right at all.168 The common thread among these options is
that by giving this purchase right to tenants, who have a variety of ways to
exercise it, the law fundamentally strengthens tenants’ bargaining power at
the point of sale — where tenants frequently have the least power.169 And
in a city with even more racially unequal housing and economic indicators
than New York City, that re-balancing of power is strikingly important.170
D.C.’s TOPA is triggered when the owner takes steps to sell or issues
notice of intent to recover possession of units from tenants or to vacate to

164. D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3404.02(a) (West 2016).
165. See id. § 42-3404.06; DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 6.
166. See DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 13. The federal LIHTC program, for example,
which costs the federal government about $8 billion a year, is the “primary program that
encourages new development of below market apartments.” It allows investors to purchase
federal income tax credits, the proceeds of which are used for affordable housing
development. See Schuetz, supra note 113.
167. See DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 13 (noting that not all such developers are
“legitimate and trustworthy,” with practices sometimes “border[ing] on the predatory”).
168. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3404.07; DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 3. In the case
where tenants take a payment instead of exercising their purchase right, the landlord will be
unlimited in their ability to sell the building on the open market.
169. See Biron, supra note 157.
170. See generally Claire Zippel, Building the Foundation: A Blueprint for Creating
Affordable Housing for DC’s Lowest-Income Residents, D.C. FISCAL POL’Y INST. (Apr. 4,
2018),
https://www.dcfpi.org/all/building-the-foundation-a-blueprint-for-creating-affordable-housi
ng-for-dcs-lowest-income-residents/#_ednref7 [https://perma.cc/FF9X-25VN].
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demolish.171 The owner must provide notice to each tenant and post the
notice conspicuously in the building.172 If tenants want to respond, they
must form a tenant association (if the building has more than five units).173
The tenants, as a group, can then decide to buy, exercise their purchase
rights in conjunction with third parties, or sell or assign their right.174 After
tenants express interest, the owner must give at least 120 days to negotiate
a contract of sale.175
A majority of tenant groups that purchase their building directly and
receive city funding develop their buildings as LECs.176 The City program
that funds this development imposes affordability requirements for 40
years.177 A recent policy development in D.C. — the implementation of
the District Opportunity to Purchase Act (DOPA) — will enable the City,
in addition to tenants, to purchase buildings when tenants do not.178
As is always true for affordable housing development policies, funding
for D.C.’s TOPA is a big challenge. 179 Even on the expanded timeline
TOPA put in place, tenants in Washington, D.C., have found it difficult to
access sufficient financing (both for acquisition and any needed
renovations) for a wide variety of reasons. 180 The City’s First Right
Purchase Program provides some funding for low- and moderate-income
residents looking to purchase their building through TOPA, but those funds
vary by year and are limited.181 Tenants face a different set of issues with

171. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3404.02(a) (West 2017); DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 3.
172. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3402.03; DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 4.
173. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3404.11(1); DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 4. Tenants have
45 days to form a tenant association and register their intent to purchase the building (or 30
days if they have already formed a tenant association). See Reed, supra note 154, at 3.
174. See DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 3, 6.
175. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3402.03; DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 5.
176. See Reed, supra note 154, at 3–4. D.C. offers funding for tenants who opt for the
limited-equity cooperative model. See id. at 4.
177. See id.
178. See Martin Austermuhle, After a Decade of Waiting, D.C. Implements Law Allowing
It to Buy Buildings to Keep Them Affordable, WAMU (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://wamu.org/story/18/11/15/after-a-decade-of-waiting-d-c-implements-law-allowing-itto-buy-buildings-to-keep-them-affordable/ [https://perma.cc/Y479-T5DX]; see also Noah
Telerski, Prior to Implementing a Decade-Old Law with New Powers to Preserve
Affordable Housing, DC Government Is Still Finalizing a List of Qualified Developers, D.C.
LINE
(Apr.
5,
2019),
https://thedcline.org/2019/04/05/prior-to-implementing-a-decade-old-law-with-new-powersto-preserve-affordable-housing-dc-government-is-still-finalizing-a-list-of-qualified-develop
ers/ [https://perma.cc/BG75-HBSL].
179. A tenant first right of purchase may not be enough to allow tenants to realistically
buy at current or recent real estate prices. See supra Introduction (discussing Stuyvesant
Town).
180. See DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 16–21.
181. See Reed, supra note 154, at 1, 11.
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private lenders, whose concerns include leadership and group dynamics
among tenants, tenants’ ability to repay, low loan-to-value ratio, and lack
of credit history of the tenant association.182 Even when they can secure
private financing, tenants struggle to align the timing of the financing with
each point in the acquisition process: down payment, acquisition loan,
construction loan if needed, and the eventual permanent loan. 183
Community lenders are often more flexible,184 for example, taking junior
positions to other private lenders. 185 Still, financing remains an
insurmountable obstacle in many cases. For more buildings in D.C. to fully
take advantage of TOPA, the City would have to dedicate substantially
more public funding to the program.
Another major challenge for D.C.’s TOPA, which has echoes in New
York City’s experience with HDFC cooperatives,186 is technical assistance.
A report on the strengths and deficiencies of D.C.’s TOPA found that
adequate technical assistance from organizers, lawyers, development
consultants, and others was integral to the success of TOPA buildings.187
In endeavoring to buy a property, let alone buy, renovate, and convert to a
cooperative or redevelop as affordable rentals, the expertise of each of
these professionals comes to bear — and predictably, tenant associations
that try to navigate the process on their own struggle.188
While relatively few buildings complete the TOPA process each year,
they have extremely positive outcomes in preventing displacement and
preserving affordability. 189 D.C. does not keep comprehensive data on
TOPA projects, but a study from 2013 found that $130 million from the
City and other government sources had supported 49 LEC projects over the
previous decade, preserving nearly 1,400 units of affordable housing.190
Housing costs for residents in TOPA cooperatives are dramatically lower

182. See DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 16.
183. See id. at 17, 19–21.
184. See id. at 18–19.
185. See id. at 19.
186. See infra Section II.C.i.
187. See DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 10.
188. See id. at 10–14.
189. A 2004 study found that 81 LECs had been created through TOPA. Only four had
been foreclosed on in that time, and 80% of the remaining were in stable or excellent
condition. See COAL. FOR NONPROFIT HOUS. & ECON. DEV., A STUDY OF LIMITED-EQUITY
COOPERATIVES
IN
THE
DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA
3
(2004),
https://community-wealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/report-cnh
ed.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2LZ-5RAX].
190. See Reed, supra note 154, at 1, 6.
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than for other residents in their surrounding area,191 and the program has
given D.C. one of the highest concentrations of LECs in the country.192
Although the overall number of cooperatives created is likely modest, they
have helped provide “a bulwark against displacement” in gentrifying
neighborhoods .193
ii. San Francisco’s Community Opportunity to Purchase Act
Recently, several other municipalities around the country have looked to
D.C.’s program as a model for mitigating their own increasingly
unaffordable rents. San Francisco has a new law called the Community
Opportunity to Purchase Act (COPA) that gives nonprofits a first right to
purchase apartment buildings listed for sale.194 Other than the identity of
the right holder, COPA works similarly to D.C.’s law. It expands on a preexisting San Francisco program called the Small Sites Program, which
helped nonprofits acquire buildings, but only those with three or fewer
units. 195 A substantial concern about COPA is that the law does not
provide a permanent source of funding, without which observers suggest
the program is not likely to succeed.196
When the bill was under consideration, COPA faced a common critique
(in this case from a real estate trade group) that the law would merely
“shuffle ownership” of existing units rather than create new ones.197 But

191. See COAL. FOR NONPROFIT HOUS. & ECON. DEV., supra note 189, at 14 (finding that
median LECs building monthly membership charges were about half of HUD’s fair market
rental rate for the District).
192. See Mike Ege, Can the City Buy Private Land for Non-Profit Housing? Ordinance
Faces Legal, Logistical Challenges, BAY CITY BEACON (Apr. 8, 2019),
https://www.thebaycitybeacon.com/politics/can-the-city-buy-private-land-for-non-profit-ho
using/article_00ea6738-5a26-11e9-8262-9bbfe52c6fc0.html
[https://perma.cc/PT65-GA7A].
193. See DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 9.
194. See Jared Brey, Nonprofits May Soon Have the First Chance to Buy Apartment
Buildings
in
San
Francisco,
NEXT
CITY
(Apr.
9,
2019),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/nonprofits-may-soon-have-the-first-chance-to-buy-apartment
-buildings-in-san [https://perma.cc/87NP-KPSB]; Administrative, Business and Tax
Regulations Codes — Nonprofit Organizations’ First-Right-to-Purchase Multi-Family
Residential
Buildings,
CITY
&
CNTY.
S.F.
BD.
SUPERVISORS,
https://sfgov.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3781283&GUID=DACC669F-23E4-4
80B-B4B3-CA6D1D7D90E6 [https://perma.cc/4UPJ-NZNY] (last visited Oct. 31, 2020).
195. COPA applies to buildings with more than three units. This is especially important
because D.C.’s TOPA has been shown to work better in bigger buildings, which were
previously not available for a nonprofit first right to purchase in San Francisco. See Ege,
supra note 192.
196. See Brey, supra note 194.
197. See Jim Rutkowski, Multi-Unit Properties Face Complicated New Regulations, BAY
CITY
BEACON
(Oct.
8,
2019),
https://www.thebaycitybeacon.com/politics/multi-unit-properties-face-complicated-new-reg
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proponents of the law point out that the city is losing more affordable units
than it builds every year, and programs that preserve what little affordable
housing remains are sorely needed. 198 One hopeful advocate cast the
possibilities of the law in social housing terms: COPA is “the DeLorean
that will take us to a future where we won’t need rent control, because
housing will be finally treated as a utility and not as a commodity.”199
iii. Montgomery County, Maryland’s Public Right of First Refusal
The Maryland Housing Opportunities Commission, Montgomery
County’s public housing agency, oversees a statutory first right of purchase
— specifically, a right of first refusal — for the county and tenant
associations in properties with four or more units built before 1981.200 The
Commission has only used the law eight times in 30 years, but the law
punches above its weight in terms of impact. 201 Because the program
includes long-term planning, buildings are acquired strategically. 202
Access to dedicated funding sources allows the Commission to make
purchases much more quickly than municipalities that do not.203 And that
the Commission is “organized as a local independent agency . . . insulates
political representatives from needing to pick sides in what are often
contentious fights over affordable housing developments.”204 Even where
the County does not ultimately use its right to purchase a building, the law
has nonetheless given it leverage to negotiate with developers to add
affordability. 205 So, even where used infrequently, the purchase
opportunity law has had a positive benefit in the long term.206 That the
right is used so rarely, though, has led to criticism that it would be better to
tailor the first right of purchase more narrowly to a smaller subset of
residential buildings. 207 A more tailored right would minimize costs

ulations/article_9e4dc54c-ea4f-11e9-a39d-67e637c87623.html
[https://perma.cc/2UA8-PHG5].
198. See Ege, supra note 192.
199. Id.
200. See Damrosch, supra note 149, at 841; see also Rights of First Refusal, supra note
148.
201. See Damrosch, supra note 149, at 841.
202. See id. at 841–42.
203. See id. at 841.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 841–42 (“For example, Montgomery County will automatically waive its
right of first refusal if the new buyer agrees to a three-year moratorium on rent increases.”).
206. See id. at 841–43.
207. See id. at 841–42 n.139.
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imposed on owners generally, given how few buildings the County
purchases.208
C. Lessons from Two New York City Housing Programs
Two New York City housing programs offer particular lessons for any
attempt to create a first right of purchase program in the City. The HDFC
cooperative program, as the City’s primary tenant ownership program, has
faced issues that will inform any future effort to give tenants — especially
low-income tenants — the ability to buy their homes. A much more recent
program, Neighborhood Pillars, has developed a way to finance nonprofit
acquisition of buildings at risk of becoming unaffordable. 209 Both
programs offer lessons and tools for any future program seeking to preserve
affordability in existing buildings at the point of ownership transfer.
i. Lessons Learned: History and Challenges of HDFC Cooperatives
Starting in the 1970s, New York City experienced a wave of
disinvestment and abandonment of rental buildings by landlords.210 After
the City’s in rem foreclosure law211 was adjusted in 1976 to allow the City
to foreclose on and take into ownership buildings with just one year of tax

208. See id. at 841, 844.
209. See Neighborhood Pillars, N.Y.C. DEP’T HOUS. PRES. & DEV.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/services-and-information/neighborhood-pillars.page
[https://perma.cc/L4M7-DQUG] (last visited Oct. 31, 2020).
210. See
Decade
of
Fire,
INDEP.
LENS,
https://www.pbs.org/independentlens/films/decade-of-fire/ [https://perma.cc/4ZBQ-WKQB]
(last visited Nov. 13, 2020). A number of factors contributed to this phenomenon, including
loss of working class jobs in the City due to de-industrialization, devolution of funding for
social services and safety net programs to the local level, federal policy that redlined urban
neighborhoods of color and contributed to white flight to the suburbs, the New York City
fiscal crisis, and rampant corruption in the state’s fire insurance program. See id.; see also
Andrew Scherer, Is There Life After Abandonment — The Key Role of New York City’s in
Rem Housing in Establishing an Entitlement to Decent, Affordable Housing, 13 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 953, 954–56 (1985) (explaining the market dynamics of landlord
abandonment).
211. See New York City, N.Y., Local Law No. 45 (1976) (codified as amended at New
York City Administrative Code § 11-4120). Until 1996, this law allowed the City to
foreclose on “properties that were significantly delinquent in their taxes” by taking
ownership of the properties. OFF. OF N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, BUILDING
AN AFFORDABLE FUTURE: THE PROMISE OF A NEW YORK CITY LAND BANK 6 (2016),
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/The_Case_for_A_New_York_C
ity_Land_Bank.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C84-MG3U]. After 1996, the City moved away from
in rem foreclosures to the tax lien sales model, which deals with tax-delinquent properties
by putting a lien on the property for the unpaid debt and selling the lien to third parties, who
can “foreclose on a property if the lien remains unpaid.” Id. at 7.
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arrears,212 New York City suddenly became landlord to tens of thousands
of units in a “massive public takeover.”213 The City, eager to transfer these
buildings back out of public ownership, created a program to allow tenants
to form LECs and buy their units from the City for as little as $250.214
These HDFC cooperatives had several requirements designed to keep them
affordable: “flip-tax” provisions that transfer some of the profit on a sale to
the cooperative itself, income requirements for new shareholders who
would buy into the cooperatives, and tax subsidies to keep maintenance
fees low.215 These requirements were designed to limit the profit motive of
the seller, keep resale prices and maintenance costs low, and ensure that
HDFC cooperatives sold to second owners prioritized lower-income New
Yorkers.216
Decades later, many such buildings have flourished and have been
integral to the stability and economic development in the neighborhoods
where they are located. To the concern of those who want to see the
program maintain affordability for future low-income residents, however,
some HDFC cooperative units have sold at close to market rate despite the
income restrictions on buyers. 217 But many other HDFC cooperative

212. See Scherer, supra note 210, at 956–57; Michael Goodwin, City Struggling in
Attempts to Sell Tax-Delinquent Apartment Buildings, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 1981),
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/04/08/nyregion/city-struggling-in-attempts-to-sell-tax-delin
quent-apartment-buildings.html [https://perma.cc/AVS9-SYJY] (“The number of
foreclosures has increased dramatically since the city passed a law in 1976 that shortened
the permitted period of delinquency from three years to one.”).
213. Scherer, supra note 210, at 953, 956. At the peak of landlord abandonment in 1975,
the City took over 40,000 units a year; by 1985, the City owned 5,100 in rem buildings
totaling 48,000 units. See id. at 954, 957.
214. See Michelle Higgins, Bargains with a ‘But,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/29/realestate/affordable-new-york-apartments-with-a-cat
ch.html [https://perma.cc/BT5K-35HP]. The City first attempted to sell these buildings to
private developers but found that they frequently were not interested because of the
buildings’ locations and bad conditions. See also Scherer, supra note 210, at 962.
215. See Higgins, supra note 214.
216. See id.
217. See Nikita Stewart, Under City Program, Renters-Turned-Homeowners Could
Become
Renters
Again,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
29,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/29/nyregion/co-op-low-income-nyc-rent.html
[https://perma.cc/8DZX-N45R]. That some cooperative shareholders have been able to sell
their units for $1 million or more shows the economic transformation of these buildings and
neighborhoods. See id. High sales also represent the gentrification of these buildings —
although there is an income limit for HDFC buyers, there is no asset limit; the buyers who
can qualify while still being able to pay thus generally are those who can draw on family
wealth. See Abigail Savitch-Lew et al., City Pushes to Regulate Low-Income Coops Amid
Some
Shareholders’
Opposition,
CITY
LIMITS
(Feb.
24,
2017),
https://citylimits.org/2017/02/24/city-pushes-to-regulate-low-income-coops-amid-some-shar
eholders-opposition/ [https://perma.cc/H84B-PKJ6]. High sales are worrying because a unit
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buildings are in distress218 — behind on tax and utility bills, and with issues
such as pests, mold, and lack of heat and hot water.219 In 2015, the City
began foreclosing on these cooperatives and then transferring them to
nonprofit developers to run the buildings as rentals if the HDFC board did
not form a plan to pay the debts.220 HDFC cooperative residents criticized
the move, pointing out that the City had set up the now-struggling
cooperatives for failure by neglecting them for years.221 HDFC buildings’
issues have stemmed from a combination of building mismanagement, lack
of resources, lack of oversight from New York City’s Department of
Housing Preservation and Development (HPD), and bureaucratic
hurdles.222
In 2016, the City released its proposed reforms for the program: in
exchange for a bigger tax break, buildings would pay for stricter oversight
by a manager and monitor, agree to regulations such as more stringent
subletting rules, and most significantly for some, impose a new sales
cap.223 Buildings that did not agree to the price cap would cease to receive
any tax exemption at all. 224 Many cooperative residents objected
strongly, 225 arguing that the plan seemed punitive after all the work
residents put in over the years, that the price caps were overbearing and
paternalistic, and that HDFC residents had not been given enough

that sells for such a high amount will almost certainly never again be in the reach of low- or
middle-income buyers. See id.
218. See De Blasio Wants Monitors to Oversee 1,200 Privately Owned Co-ops, REAL
DEAL
(Feb.
27,
2017),
https://therealdeal.com/2017/02/27/de-blasio-wants-monitors-to-oversee-1200-privately-ow
ned-co-ops/ [https://perma.cc/33JY-Z8FA]. The number of HDFC cooperatives in distress is
well above average numbers for other rental or cooperative buildings in the City. See Oscar
Perry Abello, Help Is on the Way for Low-Income Co-op Buildings in NYC, NEXT CITY
(Mar.
1,
2017),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/preserving-nyc-affordable-housing-habitat-cdfi-loan
[https://perma.cc/V6JK-PZP6] (citing an estimate that 300, or 25% of HDFC cooperative
buildings, are distressed). It is perhaps not surprising that many of them are struggling,
given that distress was a trait inherent to the buildings’ origins.
219. See Stewart, supra note 217.
220. See id. If HDFC boards make an arrangement with the City to pay their arrears, they
can be removed from the pending foreclosure list. See id.
221. See Savitch-Lew et al., supra note 217.
222. See Stewart, supra note 217.
223. See Isabel Vincent & Melissa Klein, Inside de Blasio’s ‘Land Grab’ Aimed at
Boosting Affordable Housing Data, N.Y. POST (Feb. 26, 2017, 5:29 AM),
https://nypost.com/2017/02/26/inside-de-blasios-land-grab-aimed-at-boosting-affordable-ho
using-data/ [https://perma.cc/839X-UTKA].
224. See Savitch-Lew et al., supra note 217.
225. See id.
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opportunity for input into the proposal. 226 The Urban Homesteading
Assistance Board (UHAB) — the primary nonprofit organization that
provides technical assistance for HDFC cooperatives — had pushed for
reform and even lower price caps, but still found these proposed reforms to
be too much of a “blanket solution.” 227 The proposed reforms were
ultimately not passed, but variations have been introduced in each
legislative session since then.228 While few new cooperatives are created in
the HDFC program anymore, its successes and challenges over its history
will likely be the main political and policy reference point for any new
program that seeks to make tenants owners of low-income cooperatives.
ii. Neighborhood Pillars Program: A Model for Financing a New York City
TOPA Law
Neighborhood Pillars, launched in 2018, is an HPD 229 program that
helps nonprofits buy privately owned buildings at risk of rent increase in
order to lock in affordable rents.230 The program aims to create a “firewall
against displacement” by ensuring that buildings in gentrifying
neighborhoods with low rents are not sold to speculative investors who will
hike rents or displace current tenants. 231 The program’s financing
mechanism assists nonprofits and other qualified sponsors to buy privately
owned apartments from for-profit landlords by leveraging government

226. See Andrew Reicher, CityViews: The Case for New Regs for the City’s Affordable
Co-ops,
CITY
LIMITS
(Mar.
21,
2017),
https://citylimits.org/2017/03/21/cityviews-the-case-for-new-regs-for-the-citys-affordable-c
o-ops/ [https://perma.cc/RM6T-7ELD].
227. See Vincent & Klein, supra note 223.
228. Assembly Member Harvey Epstein has circulated his draft bill on HDFC reforms for
possible 2020 introduction. See Erica F. Buckley, 2020 Is the “Year of the Homeowner” in
the
New
York
State
Legislature,
NIXON PEABODY
(Feb.
3,
2020),
https://www.nixonpeabody.com/en/ideas/articles/2020/02/03/year-of-the-homeowner-in-nys
[https://perma.cc/87QS-8V2D]; see also Summary of NYS Assemblymember Harvey
Epstein’s January 6, 2020 Draft Legislation to Change the NYS Private Housing Finance
Law
(PHFL),
HDFC
COAL.
(Jan.
17,
2020),
https://www.hdfccoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/EpsteinSummaryEnglishSpanis
hBill1.17.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/84LY-DJJG].
229. New York City’s Department of Housing Preservation and Development,
established in 1978, oversees the City’s programs related to all aspects of privately owned
housing, including new construction and preservation of affordable housing, enforcement of
the Housing Maintenance Code, and neighborhood planning. See About HPD, N.Y.C. DEP’T
HOUS.
PRES.
&
DEV.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/about/about-hpd.page
[https://perma.cc/Y4PH-7TZB] (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
230. See Neighborhood Pillars, supra note 209.
231. See OFF. OF THE MAYOR, CITY OF N.Y., HOUSING NEW YORK 2.0, at 22 (2017),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/about/housing-new-york-2-0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AZC9-9RW7].
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subsidy to access additional private financing.232 Only a small number of
buildings have gone through the program so far,233 but they have succeeded
in locking in permanent affordability at levels affordable to pre-existing
tenants for many units.234 These results show that the program’s financing
mechanism may hold promise for the preservation of more affordable
housing in New York City.
Nonprofits that identify qualifying buildings in their catchment areas can
apply to HPD for support — both financial and technical — in acquiring
them.235 Qualifying buildings have three or more units and already have
below-market rents.236 Those below-market rents are what would attract
speculative buyers; the buildings’ purchase, renovation, and preservation as
affordable would thus head off the opportunity for investors to hike rents to
make a profit. 237 Neighborhood Pillars buildings are required to
permanently restrict rents on 30%–50% of the units, and to restrict rents on
the remainder of the units for the 30-year term of the regulatory
agreement. 238 Crucially, Neighborhood Pillars offers funding to new
owners for buildings in which maintaining tenants’ currently affordable
rents would not otherwise support the cost of acquiring the buildings. The
City aims to preserve those affordable rents by filling that gap.
Because potential Neighborhood Pillars buildings are otherwise on the
open market for purchase, nonprofits interested in buying need access to

232. See Jared Brey, New York Program Helps Keep Apartments Affordable, NEXT CITY
(Sept.
5,
2019),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/new-york-program-helps-keep-apartments-affordable
[https://perma.cc/E8KN-NUBP].
233. As of August 2019, HPD had facilitated the acquisition of ten buildings totaling 339
units. There has not been a publicly reported number of units since. See Press Release,
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., City and Partners Announce First Round of
Acquisitions for Neighborhood Pillars Program (Aug. 22, 2019) [hereinafter City and
Partners
Announce
First
Round
of
Acquisitions],
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/news/053-19/city-partners-first-round-acquisitions-neighbor
hood-pillars-program#/0 [https://perma.cc/T4WS-824L].
234. See Neighborhood Pillars Term Sheet, N.Y.C. DEP’T HOUS. PRES. & DEV. (Dec.
2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/services/neighborhood-pillars-term-sheet.
pdf [https://perma.cc/53FE-794T].
235. See Press Release, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., De Blasio Administration
Launches Neighborhood Pillars Program to Protect Tenants and Preserve Affordability
(Dec.
20,
2018)
[hereinafter
De
Blasio
Administration
Launches],
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/608-18/de-blasio-administration-launchesneighborhood-pillars-program-protect-tenants-preserve [https://perma.cc/LG7R-HPHF].
236. See Neighborhood Pillars Term Sheet, supra note 234. Qualifying buildings also
may not have regulatory agreements regarding affordability with the City, State, or federal
government. See id.
237. See Brey, supra note 232.
238. See Neighborhood Pillars Term Sheet, supra note 234.
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financing on a quick timeline to compete with private buyers. The Down
Payment Assistance Fund (DPAF) fills the gap so that nonprofits can
compete timewise, while also taking advantage of private financing.239 The
DPAF is thus a key tool for helping nonprofits buy these buildings.240
Although the HDFC cooperative program and Neighborhood Pillars
have created relatively few affordable housing units compared to the total
number of units across the City, they both contain important tools and
lessons for new housing programs going forward.
III. BUILDING A TOPA LAW FOR NEW YORK CITY
TOPA laws can be a vital tool in preserving affordability in changing
neighborhoods. In New York City, where property values are everincreasing, and long-time residents of changing neighborhoods are often
pushed out by rising rents, such a tool may be key for addressing the
affordability crisis. The City’s scarcity of affordable, developable land241
makes an affordability preservation tool such as TOPA even more vital:
building new subsidized housing at rents that low-income New Yorkers can
afford is immensely expensive, 242 so doing more to maintain or even
decrease rents in existing buildings is especially imperative. And the
possibility that property values for multifamily apartment buildings may
decrease in the economic downturn makes this an even timelier opportunity
for New York City.
This Part first lays out the criteria for a successful TOPA law in New
York City. It then describes a preliminary proposal from a New York state
senator for a TOPA law, as well as a more detailed discussion of important
considerations for shaping the legislation.
A. How to Build a TOPA Law for New York City: Criteria Borrowed
from Social Housing Models
A TOPA law in New York City should prioritize (1) permanent
affordability, (2) democratic resident control, and (3) racial and economic
equity. These criteria, which aim to respond to tenant disempowerment
created by market pressures and landlord-friendly housing policies, also

239. See Brey, supra note 232. The City then partners with the New York City
Acquisition Fund in providing the acquisition loan (with much of the original down
payment revolving to the Down Payment Assistance Fund). See De Blasio Administration
Launches, supra note 235; see also Neighborhood Pillars Term Sheet, supra note 234.
240. See De Blasio Administration Launches, supra note 235.
241. See HOUSING NEW YORK, supra note 24, at 22, 31.
242. See supra Section I.E.
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closely mirror the goals of social housing.243 “Social housing” describes
models that recast housing as a public good, along the lines of mass transit
or public libraries.244 These models are not necessarily publicly owned, but
they aim to lessen the effect of market pressure on rents by removing
ownership from the speculative real estate market or imposing long-term
affordability constraints, thus “decommodifying” housing. 245
The
affordability crisis in New York City calls for a TOPA law, and social
housing concepts will make that law stronger.
i. Permanent Affordability
The City’s housing problem manifests in rents that are too high for New
Yorkers to afford. Consequently, any policy response to the problem needs
to bring down the cost of housing for residents. In the context of a TOPA
law, the details of what affordability looks like depend on what type of
ownership structure the tenants choose: a nonprofit rental building’s
affordability will be reflected in its rents, while an LEC’s affordability will
be reflected in buy-in prices and maintenance fees. Tenants exercising
their TOPA right will also have a hand in balancing dimensions of
affordability — how low costs are, how long they are ensured, and how
many units are included.
A significant contributor to New York City’s housing crisis is that most
publicly subsidized affordable units have expiration dates: affordable
housing development programs work by offering subsidy in exchange for
time-limited rent restrictions. 246 Not all landlords will increase rents to
market-rate when the restriction expires, but those in thriving real estate
markets like New York City are especially likely to do so.247 Advocates
therefore have long argued that the City should impose a permanent
affordability requirement for new housing programs.248 While a permanent
affordability mandate has challenges, such as a decrease in the number of
units produced because of increased development cost,249 a mandate would
also have the obvious benefit of protecting affordable rents indefinitely into
the future. Permanent affordability may be too difficult to finance in some

243. See Mironova & Waters, Social Housing, supra note 31.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See Reina, supra note 40, at 1277–79.
247. See id. at 1279–80.
248. See PERMANENT AFFORDABILITY, supra note 33.
249. See Reina, supra note 40, at 1281. Permanent affordability mandates may also affect
where new subsidized housing is built, and it may hamper the City’s flexibility in allocating
resources in the future. See id
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cases, but it remains a worthwhile goal for a TOPA program to be
ultimately weighed by tenants.
ii. Tenant Control
A range of factors has led to broad tenant disempowerment in New York
City.250 Tenants have had little control over where they can afford to live,
conditions in their apartments, and whether they can stay in a building or
neighborhood.251 A just housing system must enable each New Yorker to
have a safe, stable, and affordable roof over their head, but it also must give
power back to the tenants.
The importance of tenant control stems from the reasons that tenants
were disempowered to begin with. The roots of tenant disempowerment
are varied and complex, but they overlap substantially with other forms of
oppression, namely racial and economic. Redlining starting in the first half
of the twentieth century directly led to increased racial segregation and the
systematic removal of resources from neighborhoods of color.252 Urban
renewal policies further stripped resources from New York City’s
communities of color and further entrenched racial housing segregation by
supporting cities in acquiring land in “blighted” neighborhoods in order to
relocate the residents, demolish structures, and create public and private
development.253
Like urban renewal, more recent waves of gentrification capitalized on
the lack of investment in New York City’s neighborhoods of color,
especially formerly racially segregated neighborhood. 254 Gentrification
imposes yet another layer of disempowerment by selectively bringing
wealth into disinvested neighborhoods that does not benefit long-time
residents.255 The neighborhood’s long-time residents start to be priced out,
with commercial and cultural touchpoints in the neighborhood displaced as

250. See supra Section I.C.
251. See Whitlow, supra note 64, at 1128–29.
252. Starting in the 1930s, a set of federal guidelines were imposed that deterred banks
from investing in neighborhoods where people of color, Jewish people, and immigrants
lived. The resulting policy was called redlining. See Braden Crooks, What Is Redlining?,
VIMEO (2016), https://vimeo.com/172945692 [https://perma.cc/K7WY-J79L] (Dr. Mindy
Fullilove explaining the process and history of redlining).
253. Urban renewal was a federal funding program, most active in the 1950s–1960s. See
About,
URB.
REVIEWER,
http://www.urbanreviewer.org/#map=12/40.7400/-74.0690&page=about.html
[https://perma.cc/844R-JWFS] (last visited Sept. 27, 2020).
254. See Whitlow, supra note 64, at 1100 n.96.
255. See id. at 1101–03.
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well.256 New Yorkers of color are thus harmed both by the departure and
the re-entry of white people into what has become their neighborhood.
This very brief history of racial injustice regarding housing and
neighborhoods in New York City demonstrates the importance of reempowering tenants, specifically tenants of color, in structuring a plan that
addresses the core problems with the City’s housing market. While on its
face, the affordability crisis is a question of rent amount relative to income,
more deeply, it is a problem with profit-driven policies and racist
structures. 257 That racism is evident in homelessness, eviction, and
foreclosure statistics, as well as health, education, and economic outcomes.
The solution, then, to the affordability crisis, must address the problem
at all levels. A solution that decommodifies housing without giving power
to tenants risks the situation that public housing in New York City
currently faces. While New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA)
buildings are almost entirely protected from market pressures by public
ownership and permanently affordable rents set to tenants’ incomes,
building conditions are nonetheless in a state of crisis level.258 Racism has
imbued both the politics of appropriating adequate funds to maintain
housing conditions and the administration and management of the housing
itself. 259 These factors have led to tremendous repair and maintenance
backlogs, and the lack of tenant power has contributed significantly to that
imbalance.
Tenant control — at the point of sale as well as extending into the future
— is thus an essential element for designing a TOPA law for New York
City. In a city of tenants, placing the power to make crucial decisions in
their hands, rather than in the hands of landowners, is a needed step toward
housing justice.
iii. Racial and Economic Equity
Racial and economic equity, like tenant empowerment, are essential
ingredients for a successful TOPA law because injustice underlies New
York City’s affordability crisis. The City’s dynamics of extractive
disinvestment and reinvestment through redlining policies, urban renewal,

256. See MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 57, at 43–44.
257. See Rasheedah Phillips, Addressing Race and Gender Inequities at the Root of
Housing
Injustice,
LAW & POL. ECON. PROJECT
(Jan.
16,
2020),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/addressing-race-and-gender-inequities-at-the-root-of-housing-inj
ustice/ [https://perma.cc/T8Z7-4NWN].
258. See Sadef Ali Kully, Understanding NYCHA’s New Rescue Plan, CITY LIMITS (Aug.
10,
2020),
https://citylimits.org/2020/08/10/understanding-nychas-new-rescue-plan/
[https://perma.cc/GK7P-Q3DP].
259. See id.
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and gentrification have all contributed to the grave disparities in who can
afford secure housing. TOPA law provisions that further racial and
economic equity are thus especially important.
Other New York City housing models provide examples of how to bake
equity into a housing program. Models like Mitchell-Lama rentals are
especially socially egalitarian because they are mixed-income — they
embrace tenants with a broader range of incomes than in many other forms
of subsidized housing. 260 HDFC cooperatives also contribute to social
equity, largely because of their history: having their roots in tenant
organizing in disinvested neighborhoods means that most still have more
lower-income residents than comparable models. 261 Conversely, both
public housing and owner-occupied housing tend to entrench inequality,
given their connections to racial segregation.262
B. Senator Myrie’s Proposal
Inspired by D.C.’s TOPA, New York State Senator Zellnor Myrie 263
announced in early 2020 his intention to draft similar legislation for New
York State.264 Partly prompted by the recent success in New York State
rent law reform, Myrie envisions a TOPA law for New York as a next step
in the broader fight for housing affordability.265 In addition to Myrie’s bill
for tenants, a New York City Council bill has been introduced that would
establish a first right of purchase for nonprofit organizations.266

260. See Mironova & Waters, How Social Is That Housing?, supra note 128.
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. Senator Myrie is a freshman Senator from Central Brooklyn. In his campaign, he
discussed his upbringing in rent-stabilized housing in Brooklyn and the importance of that
stability. See About, ZELLNOR FOR ST. SENATE, https://zellnorforstatesenate.com/about/
[https://perma.cc/48UM-FJ2N] (last visited Oct. 8, 2020). He serves on the Housing,
Construction, and Community Development Committee and has made affordable housing a
priority during his tenure in the State Senate. See id.
264. See Georgia Kromrei, Bill: Make Landlords Give Tenants First Shot to Buy
Buildings, REAL DEAL (Jan. 31, 2020, 8:35 AM) [hereinafter Kromrei, Make Landlords Give
Tenants
First
Shot],
https://therealdeal.com/2020/01/31/bill-make-landlords-give-tenants-first-shot-to-buy-buildi
ngs/ [https://perma.cc/J8DC-3EBV]; Sydney Pereira, Tenants Would Get Priority to Buy
Their Landlord’s Building Under New Bill, GOTHAMIST (Feb. 3, 2020),
https://gothamist.com/news/tenants-would-get-priority-buy-their-landlords-building-under-n
ew-bill [https://perma.cc/CJ8F-EHZG].
265. See Pereira, supra note 264.
266. Giving Qualified Entities a First Opportunity to Purchase and an Opportunity to
Submit an Offer to Purchase Certain Residential Buildings When Offered for Sale, N.Y.
CITY
COUNCIL,
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4573837&GUID=0603C069-82
DE-4977-904B-A07F3F468D90&Options=&Search= [https://perma.cc/8TS6-M8GR] (last
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Many expected that the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act, by
effectively locking in stabilized rents, would make it more difficult for
overleveraged landlords to keep their buildings. 267 And with the added
strain of the COVID-19 pandemic, landlords who already had tight
finances are likely to be in even worse shape.268 Senator Myrie’s TOPA
proposal is designed to take advantage of those landlords leaving the
market: when they decide to sell (or default on their loan), the law would
require that tenants are offered the opportunity to buy those buildings
first.269 Especially in the context of the COVID-19 economic downturn,
advocates hope this intervention will stave off some of the predatory real
estate investment seen in New York City’s 2001 and 2008 housing market
drops. 270 Myrie’s TOPA proposal will also be designed to further
capitalize on this move away from a speculative model of housing271 by
facilitating tenant ownership in an LEC model.272
Like the D.C. law, Senator Myrie’s proposal also includes the option for
tenants to (1) buy the building, (2) assign that right to a developer of their
choosing, or (3) concede their rights for a fee from the landlord.273 The
proposed legislation will also lay out a process for agreeing to a price: each
side would get an appraisal, with a third party deciding if the appraisals
differ. 274 The plan includes funding for tenants to buy their building
through low-interest loans or other options, structured similarly to HPD’s
Neighborhood Pillars Program.275 Additionally, it is intended to dovetail
with the community land trust model; tenants can assign their first right of
purchase to a CLT in New York City, which would be able to assist in
developing the building as an affordable rental or LEC.276

visited Nov. 13, 2020). The bill was introduced by Councilmember Carlina Rivera, who
warned that “in times such as this, when the real estate market is in flux, . . . speculators can
easily swoop in and increase gentrification in our neighborhoods.” Sadef Ali Kully,
Advocates: NYC Needs More Money, New Model to Meet Housing Crisis, CITY LIMITS (June
26,
2020),
https://citylimits.org/2020/06/26/advocates-nyc-needs-more-money-new-model-to-meet-hou
sing-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/4JEE-HRZY].
267. See Kromrei, Make Landlords Give Tenants First Shot, supra note 264.; see also
supra Section I.C.
268. See Brenzel, supra note 104.
269. See Kromrei, Make Landlords Give Tenants First Shot, supra note 264.
270. See Kully, supra note 266.
271. See id.
272. See Pereira, supra note 264.
273. See Kromrei, Make Landlords Give Tenants First Shot, supra note 264.
274. See id.
275. See Pereira, supra note 264.
276. See Kully, supra note 266. CLT advocates in New York City have promoted both
Senator Myrie’s forthcoming bill and the city bill that would give nonprofit organizations
the first right of purchase as mechanisms for CLTs to acquire property. See id.
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Before successful implementation, this proposal will undoubtedly face
many challenges. The biggest challenge, as with deeply affordable housing
programs generally, is establishing a dedicated funding source that is
substantial enough to support real estate acquisition in New York City.277
Myrie conceded: “Anything touching on the budget will obviously be a
source of contention, but what we’re really discussing here is investment
for long term affordability, which I don’t view as a cost, but really, an
investment.”278 Another criticism, already leveled by some in the industry,
is that tenant ownership programs require at least as much public funding
as other affordable housing programs, often for many fewer units. 279
Critics also suggest that building management is too difficult a task for
tenants. 280 Several New York City economic and racial justice
organizations that work on housing, however, support the proposed plan.281
C. Fleshing Out a Proposal for New York City
As shown in the variation between the models discussed above, 282
TOPA laws can differ by (1) who has the right to purchase and whether
that right is assignable, (2) what ownership structures and affordability
restrictions are required, (3) how the acquisition and rehabilitation are
financed, (4) how the purchase price is decided, and (5) how the program is
structured (which properties are included, how technical assistance is
provided, notice requirements, and timeline structure). This proposal seeks
to outline how each of these variables should be decided for a New York
law,283 based on the criteria above.284

277. See Kully, supra note 266.
278. See Pereira, supra note 264.
279. See Kromrei, Real Estate Pros, supra note 15.
280. See id. This criticism, however, ignores that the law would include funding for
technical assistance.
281. These organizations include the Community Service Society, the Urban
Homesteading Assistance Board, the New Economy Project, and the tenant coalition
Housing Justice For All. See Kromrei, Make Landlords Give Tenants First Shot, supra note
264.
282. See supra Section II.B.
283. This bill could be proposed at either the city or state level. If proposed at the city
level, it may run afoul of home rule laws around housing legislation. It would not seem to be
preempted by state legislation like the New York City’s Tenant Empowerment Act, which
created a right of first refusal and first opportunity to purchase for tenants of buildings
leaving the Mitchell-Lama and several federal housing programs. See Real Est. Bd. of N.Y.,
Inc. v. City Council of City of N.Y., 842 N.Y.S.2d 218, 224 (Sup. Ct. 2007). Because a
TOPA law would not directly set rents, it may not violate the Urstadt Law, either. However,
challenges of this nature would be sidestepped if the legislation is introduced at the state
level, even if it only applies to New York City.
284. See supra Section III.A.
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i. Who Has the Right to Purchase and Assignability
The first variable — who has the right to purchase — concerns whether
(1) the tenants themselves should have the opportunity to purchase (as with
TOPA in Washington, D.C.), (2) community organizations should have that
opportunity (as with COPA in San Francisco and the proposed COPA in
New York City), or (3) the government itself may exercise that right (as in
Montgomery County). The first option places emphasis on tenant
empowerment, while the latter two place emphasis on the continued
affordability of the housing, regardless of who is living in it. Per the above
criteria, both tenant control and creating continued affordability of housing
are goals important to develop in this proposal.
As D.C.’s program has shown, however, the law can do each of these: it
can give the first decision to tenants, even as the City holds a secondary
right to purchase if tenants opt not to take advantage of TOPA.285 When
the City exercises its right, as in D.C., it ultimately places the building in
nonprofit ownership, with added affordability requirements.286 Because of
this, a city or district right to purchase and a nonprofit right to purchase
collapse into the same category, in some ways.287 The question, then, is
which group should take priority in a purchase opportunity law: the tenants,
or the city and nonprofits.288
Because tenant control is a main criterion for this proposal, tenants
should be given the first right to decide the future of their home. Tenants
can then exercise their option to either take ownership themselves through
an LEC model 289 or choose a nonprofit developer to partner with to
preserve the building as affordable rentals. 290 Tenants’ first right of
purchase should take precedence over the City’s right for all the same

285. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3404.32(a) (West 2008) (“The District’s opportunity to
purchase shall be subordinate to the right of a tenant.”); supra Section II.B.i.
286. See REED, supra note 154, at 4.
287. If a city were to buy a multifamily apartment building and keep ownership, it would
be a form of public housing. While this is a possibility contemplated by some, it is a
different undertaking than usually intended by TOPA, COPA, and DOPA laws.
288. Further complicating this question is the fact that tenants, in exercising their right,
may choose to assign their right to a nonprofit developer of their choice, in furtherance of a
partnership in which the tenants would not have ownership, but could have a level of input
in the process. See DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 6.
289. Tenant ownership can be a powerful tool when chosen by a tenant association, so (as
Senator Myrie appears to intend) LECs should be a primary option for tenants to consider.
See Pereira, supra note 264. The LEC ownership structure provides an especially good path
for low-income tenants to become homeowners for two reasons: the initial price for
membership and monthly maintenance fees are both low and, because the cooperative is
obtaining the loan, individual household credit does not factor in. See Reed, supra note 154,
at 4.
290. See infra Section III.C.ii.
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reasons that tenant control is an important dimension of social housing: it
re-distributes power back from the landlord to the tenants, leads to
outcomes that better fit the community, and provides a mechanism for
addressing racial and economic inequality.291
As seen in Washington, D.C., the majority of tenants whose buildings
are for sale do not take advantage of their TOPA rights.292 One way to
recapture this missed opportunity is to give the City a secondary purchase
right, which it may use if the tenants opt not to use theirs. 293 After
purchasing a property, the City can then transfer it to a nonprofit developer
with additional affordability requirements. 294 The City thus is able to
intervene and preserve the affordability of that building, whether or not the
tenants decide to exercise their right.
While a first right of purchase for a city may not be an ideal affordable
housing policy in every case, it does have certain advantages. Compared
with eminent domain, 295 for example, a broad statutory first right of
purchase for a city is likely to be less politically objectionable because,
under a TOPA law, the seller has already decided to sell.296 Acquisition by
eminent domain is also likely to be substantially more expensive297 than
preserving affordability under a TOPA law. However, unlike eminent
domain, a TOPA law does not allow the City to choose when to buy a
desired property.298 In that respect, a first right to purchase is more similar
to competitive purchase on the open market than it is to eminent domain.299
The advantage of a city’s first right to purchase over competitive purchase
on the open market is that the purchase right gives the government agency

291. See supra Section III.A.iii.
292. See DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 10. Ideally, New York’s law would also help boost
the percentage of buildings in which tenants make use of the law.
293. Washington, D.C., recently put into a place a first right to purchase for the District,
which will be secondary to TOPA. See Austermuhle, supra note 178. Although the District
will not be able to exercise its right until the tenants opt not to exercise theirs, the processes
will run concurrently to cut down overall length of the process. See Telerski, supra note
178.
294. Because the City has limited resources to acquire buildings, prioritization of
buildings will necessarily target those that are the most advantageous, in terms of
opportunity to preserve or create affordability, or prevent displacement.
295. Eminent domain is “[t]he inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately
owned property, esp. land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation
for the taking.” Eminent Domain, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
296. See Damrosch, supra note 149, at 818. Contrariwise, this also means that the City
does not have control over timing of the sale, as it does with eminent domain.
297. See generally Yun-chien Chang, An Empirical Study of Compensation Paid in
Eminent Domain Settlements: New York City, 1990–2002, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (2010).
298. The City does not choose when to buy because the law is triggered by the seller’s
move to sell.
299. See Damrosch, supra note 149, at 844.
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bargaining power it would not otherwise have. 300 For example,
Montgomery County commonly reaches agreements with developers that
they agree to a moratorium on rent increases or another public benefit if the
County waives its purchase right.301 In this way, a government agency can
use its purchase right to leverage other positive affordability outcomes,
even if it does not ultimately buy.302
ii. Limitations on the Resulting Development Structure
1. Ownership Structure
Considerations about which entities should be given a first right of
purchase are closely tied to what they would be permitted to do with that
right. Washington D.C.’s TOPA law includes the full range of possible
development structures: tenants may convert to an LEC, assign their
purchase right to a nonprofit organization that could develop the building
as affordable rentals, or assign their purchase right to a for-profit developer
to create market-rate rentals or condominiums.303
New York City, however, should exclude the last category: market-rate
rental or condominium developments. Rather, New York City’s TOPA law
should favor LECs first, and nonprofit-operated affordable rentals second.
While the total cost of acquisition and rehabilitation would be similar for
affordable rentals and LECs, the financing structure would be significantly
different.304 Both paths would likely have access to a range of government
subsidies, but rentals would have the advantage of being the most common
form of affordable housing, with several large subsidy programs
available.305
Nascent conversations in New York among advocates about the
possibility of this law are already rightfully centering LECs as a major goal

300. See id. at 841–42.
301. See id. at 842.
302. See id. (“For example, Montgomery County will automatically waive its right of
first refusal if the new buyer agrees to a three-year moratorium on rent increases.”).
303. See supra Section II.B.i.
304. Nonprofit-operated rentals would likely lean on government subsidy and other
pre-existing financing mechanisms, such as the Neighborhood Pillars program, and the floor
for affordability would be determined by those programs.
305. Buyouts that allow the developer to increase rents or condo prices and therefore
ensure higher rental income, however, have been common in D.C. See KATHRYN HOWELL,
SCOTT BRUTON & ANNA CLEMENS, COAL. FOR NONPROFIT HOUS. & ECON. DEV., CREATING
AND SUSTAINING LIMITED-EQUITY COOPERATIVES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (2020),
https://www.cnhed.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Creating-and-Sustaining-Limited-Equit
y-Cooperatives-in-Washington-DC_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/K55V-H45S].
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of the proposed legislation. 306 In many ways, LECs epitomize tenant
empowerment, while also providing long term, deep affordability.307 LECs
have downsides,308 but overall do the most to shelter buildings from market
pressure, benefitting both tenant-owners and the broader neighborhood.
Affordable, nonprofit-run rentals are the other development structure
New York City should allow in its TOPA law. As with LECs, the law
could require rentals to have long-term and deep affordability, and could
also incentivize tenant governance mechanisms.309 However, renters have
less control over their housing than tenant-owners in LECs, and may have
different affordability outcomes due to different financing models.
Tenants may have good reason to prefer to use their first right of
purchase to create affordable rentals rather than an LEC, however. In
larger buildings, especially, tenants may prefer a rental building because
that structure lets a nonprofit organization rather than the tenant association
take on the financial risk and labor.310 Depending on the funding options
provided by the City, it also may not be possible or desirable for tenants to
take on the financing burden of an LEC themselves. And depending on the
makeup of individual buildings, tenants may or may not prefer
homeownership. 311 Because LECs require proactive tenant buy-in,
buildings acquired through the City’s secondary purchase right would also
result in nonprofit-owned affordable rental apartments.
2. Type of Owner
Related to the ownership structure of buildings that opt to use a possible
TOPA law are permissible owner types. While the building’s tenants are
the initial deciders, and they have the option of becoming the ultimate
building owners, they can also assign their right to a nonprofit developer.
However, unlike D.C.’s TOPA law, a TOPA law for New York City should
not allow buildings acquired through the law to be assigned to for-profit
developers. For-profit developers agree to a deal in order to extract profit.
So, the affordable rents that tenants may be promised come at the cost of

306. See Kromrei, Make Landlords Give Tenants First Shot, supra note 264.
307. See Reed, supra note 154, at 4–5. LECs may also be less likely than other affordable
options, such as rentals, to rely on market-rate units to cross-subsidize affordable units.
308. See supra Section II.C.i.
309. Mitchell-Lama rentals, for example, give tenants rights over certain governance
decisions. See Mironova & Waters, How Social Is That Housing?, supra note 128.
310. See Oscar Perry Abello, How Tenants in D.C. Are Preserving Their Affordable
Apartments,
NEXT
CITY
(Jan.
19,
2018),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/how-tenants-dc-preserving-apartments
[https://perma.cc/8CGJ-44VN] (noting that working with a developer, nonprofit or not, is
“typical” for larger buildings taking advantage of TOPA).
311. Younger or otherwise transient tenants, for example, may prefer to rent.
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affordability for other units or future tenants. While for-profit developers
of market-rate rentals or condominiums usually provide discounts or
protections to tenants who opt to stay, they do not lock in affordability for
the building broadly, and they leave the building open to market pressures
going forward.312 Allowing for-profit developers to benefit from a TOPA
law would also fail to challenge the extractive model of residential real
estate ownership that this law seeks to impede. New York City should
therefore not permit profit-seeking developers to be assigned a TOPA
right.313
3. Affordability Restrictions
Housing affordability is multi-faceted: developing a rental building with
below-market rents creates inevitable tradeoffs. 314 Depending on the
amount of funding available, tenants may need to choose between how far
below market the rents are set, versus how long they are guaranteed at that
level, versus the overall number of affordable units in a building. 315
Because each of the three dimensions of affordability is important, this
proposal will allow tenants to decide how to weigh each dimension in their
redevelopment. For example, tenants may opt to develop two vacant units
in the building as market-rate rentals to subsidize deeper affordability for
units already occupied by low-income tenants when the sale occurs.
While tenants should be able to make decisions that best fit their needs
to an extent, any funding that comes with a TOPA law for New York
should also impose an affordability floor. In D.C., for example, tenant
associations that receive funding from the City’s First Right Purchase
Program typically must impose 40-year affordability restrictions.316 And
San Francisco’s law requires all buildings acquired through its COPA to
impose permanent affordability.317 Affordable rental buildings around the
country may also receive financing through other government subsidy
programs, which impose affordability requirements as well.318
A TOPA law for New York City may also require, for example, that
rents are set to be affordable for the tenants already in the building, or that

312. See HOWELL ET AL., supra note 305 and accompanying text.
313. However, in service of affordability and a non-speculative housing model, nonprofit
developers and affordable cooperatives should have the ability to strategically use
commercial spaces or market-rate residential units to cross-subsidize more deeply affordable
rents for the majority of units.
314. See supra Section I.E.
315. See supra Section I.E.
316. See Reed, supra note 154, at 4.
317. See supra Section II.B.ii.
318. See DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 13.
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a certain percentage of rents for vacant units are set at levels affordable for
current residents of the neighborhood. The value of letting a building’s
tenants decide the exact affordability breakdowns is that the outcomes will
steer further toward what renters need, which is notably not reflected in
what tenants usually have.319
iii. Financing
As illustrated in both the Stuyvesant Town example and in other cities
that have attempted a law like this, the main obstacle between tenants and
ownership is, frequently, access to capital. A TOPA law sets up the
structure and timeline to allow tenants to secure financing, but a purchase
right without a dedicated funding source is not enough to create a social
housing pipeline (recall the Stuyvesant Town tenants who fell almost a
billion dollars short of the winning bid).320 Because the cost of real estate
in New York City is so high, public subsidy would be required for tenants
to afford acquisition costs.321
As Senator Myrie has noted, one way to make public funding for
housing stretch further is by using and expanding on New York City’s new
Neighborhood Pillars program.322 Neighborhood Pillars, unlike most City
programs, was created to enable private acquisition of buildings to preserve
affordability.323 The program works by strategically leveraging a smaller
amount of public funding to secure private financing. 324 Neighborhood
Pillars’ financing mechanism could be adapted to tenant or nonprofit
acquisition of buildings through a TOPA law.
iv. How Purchase Price Is Determined
New York City’s TOPA law should set the purchase price for building
sales at the amount of the highest third-party offer.325 The other two ways
to set the purchase price in a right of first refusal transaction are formula

319. See OFF. OF N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, supra note 25, at 11.
320. See supra Introduction.
321. Federal subsidy is generally required for an acquisition program of this size. See
Ingrid Ellen et al., Using a Down Market to Launch Affordable Housing Acquisition
INST.
(July
23,
2020),
Strategies,
BROOKINGS
https://www.brookings.edu/research/using-a-down-market-to-launch-affordable-housing-ac
quisition-strategies/ [https://perma.cc/G59W-AT79].
322. See Pereira, supra note 264.
323. See id.
324. See supra Section II.C.ii.
325. This method derives from the common law definition of a right of first refusal. See
CORBIN & HOLMES, supra note 145. This is also the pricing mechanism for D.C.’s TOPA.
See supra Section II.A.
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price and appraised market price.326 As opposed to using a formula price,
the highest third-party offer may seem fairer to the seller because it is what
they would have received in the absence of the TOPA law. And in contrast
to the appraised market price, the highest third-party offer is less expensive
to obtain, and less subject to bias.327 The shortcomings of each method
demonstrate the slipperiness of “market price,” but the highest third-party
offer is the most practical option. While this method requires the landlord
to list their building and receive offers to set the TOPA price, it avoids the
likely pitfalls of the other options.
v. Program Structure
Beyond the main elements related to right holders, development
structure, financing, and sales price, there are a number of smaller program
details that need to be included in the law and its regulations. For example,
the law and regulations will have to state which properties are subject to a
first right to purchase, the timeline and notice requirements, and what type
of technical assistance will be available for tenants.
While D.C.’s TOPA originally included all rental buildings in the City
in the statute, 328 many other TOPA programs only apply to residential
buildings with more than a certain number of units or built before a certain
year.329 D.C. changed its law in 2018 to exclude single-unit buildings in
response to objections that tenants “with no real interest in buying the unit”
were too easily able to use “delay tactics and other unscrupulous actions.330
Limiting eligible buildings to those built before the law is passed may also
counteract a possible disincentive for new development. In order to
facilitate the criteria in this proposal, however, eligible buildings should be
defined as broadly as possible. The downsides of including more buildings
are relatively small compared to the benefit of giving tenants the
opportunity to secure long-term, deeply affordable housing.
Lawmakers will also have to strike a careful balance in determining the
timeline on which tenants must exercise their rights and the ways that
sellers must provide notice. Because a TOPA law’s requirement to act in
coordination is a significant demand on tenants, a more generous timeline
for tenant decisions is better for them. Giving tenants more time to reach a

326. See Damrosch, supra note 149, at 823.
327. See Public Affairs, Berkeley Talks Transcript: How the Real Estate Industry
Undermined
Black
Homeownership,
BERKELEY NEWS
(Apr.
10,
2020),
https://news.berkeley.edu/2020/04/10/berkeley-talks-transcript-keeanga-yamahtta-taylor/
[https://perma.cc/AX4X-5C4N].
328. See Rights of First Refusal, supra note 148.
329. See Damrosch, supra note 149, at Appendix A1.
330. See Rights of First Refusal, supra note 148.
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joint decision also increases tenant power by allowing time to collect
information, and supports equitable outcomes by allowing more of the
building’s tenants, as well as possibly neighborhood stakeholders, to give
input. However, sellers are likely to object if too much time is permitted
for tenants to reach a decision and secure financing, because it delays the
sale and increases their transaction costs. Legislators therefore must strike
a balance, while erring toward tenant control.
Requirements for how sellers notify tenants of their rights are closely
related to timeline considerations. While legislators must ensure that
tenants receive proper notice of their landlord’s intent to sell, notification
requirements that are too complex also have a downside: they may leave
both parties open to expensive litigation to unwind the deal years later if
unambiguous compliance is too challenging.331
As already under discussion by both critics and proponents of Senator
Myrie’s proposal, it will be a substantial obstacle for the City to ensure
sufficient technical assistance for tenants navigating this process.332 Often
unseen by renters, there is a significant amount of background knowledge
and labor that goes into organizing tenant associations; making informed
financial and other decisions as a tenant association; navigating city
resources and laws, as well as private lenders’ requirements; assessing,
making decisions about, and overseeing the rehabilitation of the building
itself; and then, management of the building itself once rehabilitation and
transfer of ownership are complete. 333 Lack of available technical
assistance across all of these areas has been a major contributor to why
more tenants have not successfully taken advantage of TOPA in
Washington, D.C.334 Similarly, the provision of technical assistance has
been a challenge in programs like the HDFC Cooperative program.
IV. CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
This Part describes additional considerations for how to implement a
successful TOPA law.
A. Contending with the Legacy of HDFC Cooperatives
Because it centers tenant ownership and cooperatives, a TOPA law for
New York City will need to grapple with the substantial challenges faced
by HDFC cooperatives — historically and at present. HDFC cooperative
challenges have included the level of physical disrepair that buildings were

331.
332.
333.
334.

See Damrosch, supra note 149, at 846.
See Pereira, supra note 264.
See DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 14–16.
See generally id.
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in when they entered the program, lack of government oversight and
resource allocation, and the difficulty of resident-led building
management.335 Because it is both a tenant ownership program and the
City’s main mechanism for creating LECs, the HDFC cooperative program
resembles a TOPA law more closely than any other New York City
housing program. The variety and magnitude of problems historically
faced by HDFC cooperatives336 mean that any new program that takes up
the tenant ownership mantle will need to address HDFC cooperative
program shortcomings clearly in order to succeed.
The buildings that were ultimately converted to HDFC cooperatives
specifically came from the City’s stock of buildings that had been
neglected, abandoned, or even severely damaged by landlords.337 A TOPA
program in New York City beginning now therefore would not face nearly
the level of disrepair that HDFC cooperative buildings had when tenants
took ownership.
The City is also now better positioned to provide adequate oversight and
resources and tackle the challenges inherent to resident-led building
management. Indeed, the City has proposed reforms for the HDFC
cooperative program338 that could more easily be implemented for TOPA
law LECs from the beginning. 339 HDFC cooperatives, especially at
conversion, have not always had adequate technical assistance. The
capacity that has been built over the decades, however, could be expanded
to meet the new need.
The opposition of current HDFC cooperative shareholders to stronger
regulations 340 may also provide insight into the challenges a TOPA law
would face in New York City. Although the history between the programs
would be different, similar tensions are likely to remain: homeownership

335. See supra Section II.C.i. Michael Diamond details the technical issues faced by
tenant associations in forming and buying their buildings to create cooperatives. See
DIAMOND, supra note 151, at 2.
336. See supra Section II.C.i.
337. See Scherer, supra note 210, at 954–56. HDFC cooperatives came from the stock of
buildings that the City had foreclosed on and were thus in uncommonly poor condition. See
id.
338. See Reicher, supra note 226.
339. Most HDFC cooperatives are almost completely unregulated; only 20% of HDFC
cooperatives have regulatory agreements. See Frank Lovece, The Off-Balance World of
HDFC Co-ops, HABITAT, May 2016, at 22–29. The rest have no formal mechanism through
which the City can actively monitor or assist them. See id. This has led to City foreclosure
of HDFC cooperatives in certain cases with a high level of financial distress. See
Savitch-Lew et al., supra note 217. While there have been recent efforts to impose a
regulatory agreement on all HDFC cooperative buildings that seek a tax abatement renewal,
the issue has been very fraught. See supra Section II.C.i.
340. See supra Section II.C.i.
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versus rentals, initial shareholders versus those who buy in later, and limits
on homeownership benefits such as price caps and oversight by city
government.341 Combined with stronger program design, in which the City
makes clear up front what types of resale restrictions will apply in
exchange for subsidy, a TOPA law would have a much stronger chance of
succeeding. Homeownership programs targeting historically redlined
communities can be fraught, however, 342 and the City will still need to
navigate the appropriate amount of regulation without undue paternalism.
B. Legal Concerns
The main case in New York that sheds light on how courts would handle
a TOPA law in New York City or State is Real Estate Board of N.Y., Inc. v.
City Council of City of N.Y., 343 which strongly points toward the
constitutionality of a TOPA law in New York, especially if TOPA were
passed at the state level. The case concerns a New York City purchase
opportunity law, Local Law No. 79,344 which gave tenants of certain stateor federally supported housing developments345 the rights of first refusal
and first offer when owners of those developments opted to leave those
subsidized housing programs. 346 Quickly challenged by the Real Estate
Board of New York, Local Law 79 was declared invalid by the Supreme
Court of New York County.347 Leaving aside the plaintiff’s takings, due
process, and equal protection claims, the court held that the state law that

341. LECs formed under TOPA would have oversight and a range of regulations
designed to keep the LEC affordable permanently, partly because the LEC would be
subsidized. Tenant owners, as has been true for HDFC cooperative shareholders, may chafe
against having limitations that unsubsidized homeownership does not. Andrew Reicher,
executive director of UHAB wrote compellingly on these issues in his op-ed in City Limits
about the proposed HDFC cooperatives reforms. See Reicher, supra note 226.
342. Promotion of homeownership, especially to historically redlined racial groups, risks
what Keeanga Yamahtta Taylor calls “predatory inclusion,” wherein the offer of an
opportunity such as homeownership without correcting the underlying racist and
exploitative system creates even worse outcomes for individuals who participate. See Nawal
Arjini, Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor Says There Is No Housing Crisis: ‘It’s Just Housing
Under
Capitalism,’
NATION
(Sept.
24,
2019),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/keeanga-yamahtta-taylor-race-profit/
[https://perma.cc/JCE8-45BV].
343. 842 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 2007).
344. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 26-801 (2005).
345. The programs were Mitchell-Lama (occupied on or after January 1, 1974),
Project-Based Section 8, and HUD Sections 202, 207, 221, 232, and 236.
346. See John L. Kelly, Local Law 79/New York City Tenant Empowerment Act —
Update,
NIXON
PEABODY
(Apr.
26,
2007),
https://www.nixonpeabody.com/en/ideas/articles/2007/04/26/local-law-79new-york-city-ten
ant-empowerment-act-update [https://perma.cc/3C3Q-WQR2].
347. Real Est. Bd. of N.Y., 842 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
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created one of the affordable housing programs did preempt the challenged
local law.348
This decision bodes well for a state-level TOPA in New York State.
Although Local Law No. 79 was invalidated, the grounds were limited to
preemption relative to the state law that created the Mitchell-Lama housing
program. So, the preemption issue could easily be sidestepped by enacting
a TOPA law at the state level rather than the city level. A city-level TOPA
law could also avoid preemption conflict in Real Estate Board of N.Y. by
exempting buildings in government-subsidized housing programs
authorized by state and federal laws.
Another possible legal challenge to TOPA laws is that their price-setting
mechanism violates the takings clause.349 However, TOPA laws that set
the price using either the highest third-party offer or an appraised fair
market value are likely to avoid takings clause violations.350 Courts have
found that a right of first refusal law does “not constitute a taking because
property owners retain the use and enjoyment of their property, as well as
the main economic value of selling their property.”351 And even if a court
found that a TOPA law violated a due process right, it seems likely that it
would pass both the public use test and the just compensation test.352
A TOPA law in New York State, then, so long as the pricing mechanism
is set properly, is not likely to face a successful constitutional challenge.
C. Weighing Costs
The main critique of a possible tenant opportunity to purchase in New
York City, shared by private real estate actors as well as nonprofit and
government actors, is that it is too expensive per unit of preserved
affordability.353 While the program may be expensive if viewed on a perunit basis, that analysis does not account for the broader benefits of deeply
affordable housing in mission-aligned ownership: taking buildings off of
the speculative market means that the gains for tenants are deeper, last
longer, and extend beyond lower rents. The benefits include resident
power and redress for historical injustice — it means a more just city for
everyone.

348. See id.
349. See Damrosch, supra note 149, at 821 n.42 (citing Minn. United Snowmobilers
Ass’n v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1254 (8th Cir. 1981)); A Brief Review of State and Local
Preservation Purchase Laws, supra note 161, at 217.
350. See Damrosch, supra note 149, at 821 n.42.
351. Damrosch, supra note 149, at 821 n.42 (citing Minn. United Snowmobilers, 660 F.2d
at 1254).
352. See Franzese, supra note 162, at 100–02.
353. See Kromrei, Real Estates Pros, supra note 15.
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Further, the D.C. example actually provides reasons to feel optimistic
about the cost-benefit analysis of LECs developed under a TOPA law, even
viewed in purely economic terms. 354 And preliminary data from the
Neighborhood Pillars program indicates that after leveraging private
financing, the amount of subsidy-per-unit for rental rehabilitation and
preservation compares favorably to other preservation programs.355 So, in
addition to providing a host of benefits beyond low rents, offering a
purchase right to LECs may also be a good deal.
The COVID-19 economic downturn and housing market fallout after the
2019 rent laws may together provide an opportunity for New York City to
facilitate the conversion of failing buildings on the private market into
social housing. In addition to its market consequences, the pandemic has
also created a surge in the already crisis-level need for housing that people
can afford in New York City. 356 So while the suffering economy has
already started to limit public resources for all but the most essential
programs,357 any available funding dedicated to a TOPA law would pay
dividends into the future.
And meanwhile, a greater political appetite for rethinking housing has
become clear in New York City. A powerful tenant coalition brought about
the 2019 laws, which were seen as sweeping and radical.358 Many of the
same activists and advocates have been pushing to cancel rent amidst the
COVID-19 pandemic.359 The latter movement, especially, is in sync with a
national conversation to reprioritize housing in the Homes Guarantee
platform 360 and federal legislation such as Congressperson Ilhan Omar’s
rent relief bill.361 These changes bode well for a TOPA law in New York.

354. See Reed, supra note 154, at 4.
355. See City and Partners Announce First Round of Acquisitions, supra note 233.
356. See Oksana Mironova & Thomas J. Waters, A Sudden Shock to an Overburdened
System: NYC Housing & COVID-19, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y (Apr. 6, 2020),
https://www.cssny.org/news/entry/nyc-housing-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/R4ML-9XAA].
357. See Mays, supra note 42.
358. See Samuel Stein, Tenants Won This Round, JACOBIN (June 18, 2019),
https://jacobinmag.com/2019/06/new-york-housing-tenants-universal-rent-control
[https://perma.cc/8KK9-HGVZ] (calling the legislation “a striking expression of tenants’
power”).
359. See Sadef Ali Kully, Fearing Evictions, Tenant Groups Push Rent Cancellation,
New
Housing
Voucher,
CITY
LIMITS
(July
20,
2020),
https://citylimits.org/2020/07/20/fearing-evictions-tenant-groups-push-rent-cancellation-ne
w-housing-voucher/ [https://perma.cc/8V5P-APE3].
360. See PEOPLE’S ACTION, A NATIONAL HOMES GUARANTEE (2019),
https://homesguarantee.com/wp-content/uploads/Homes-Guarantee-_-Briefing-Book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6J3K-QR42].
361. See Mironova & Waters, Social Housing, supra note 31.
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A last concern is that giving tenants the power to decide how their
building is developed may create outcomes that favor the tenants ahead of
other interests. For example, if six out of ten units in a building are
occupied when the tenants exercise their TOPA rights, the tenants would be
reasonably inclined to set higher rents in the currently vacant units to
subsidize lower rents in their own apartments. While the law should place
some limits on options that favor individual tenants over sustainable
affordability (especially when tied to funding), this proposal also defers
broadly to the principle that what is good for tenants is also good for
neighborhoods.
CONCLUSION
New York City has not meaningfully addressed its housing crisis
through existing affordable housing programs, which, despite investing a
lot of money, have failed to create the amount, depth, or length of
affordability needed to address the problem. As argued above, this is
largely because the main affordable housing programs at the local, state,
and federal levels are all geared toward private investment and operate
within the speculative market. The shortcomings of New York City’s
current models show that we need to think about housing differently: less
as a commodity and more as a public good. Social housing is a response to
this issue because it not only provides a practical solution to the
shortcomings of current major housing programs by reducing market
pressure on housing, but also prioritizes resident control and social equity
— two major absences in current housing models.
The market changes after the state rent reforms in 2019, as well as the
oncoming economic downturn, present both opportunities and challenges to
the goal of decommodifying housing. While local and state governments
will be stretched thinner in many ways, the market may also be more
accessible for non-traditional buyers like tenant associations and nonprofit
organizations. The economic downturn also promises to make the City’s
already precariously housed residents struggle even more, making it a
pivotal moment to begin implementing a social housing policy.
A TOPA law holds the promise to provide social housing in New York
City on a scale that could make an impact, especially given this heightened
moment. It would take advantage of the softening multifamily real estate
market in New York City, even as it stops (ongoing and oncoming) tenant
displacement.
Because the law would cover all privately owned
multifamily rental buildings, it would have an impact both across the City
and over time. A mechanism for creating more truly affordable housing is
the clear next step in promoting housing justice in New York City and
making the City more just and livable for all its residents.

